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CAMPAIGN SPEECH LAW WITH A TWIST: WHEN THE 
GOVERNMENT IS THE SPEAKER, NOT THE REGULATOR 
Helen Norton* 
ABSTRACT 
Although government entities frequently engage in issue-related campaign 
speech on a variety of contested ballot and legislative measures, this fact has 
been entirely overlooked in contemporary First Amendment debates over 
campaign speech law specifically and government speech more generally. The 
Supreme Court’s “campaign speech” and “government speech” dockets have 
focused to date on claims by private parties that the government has restricted 
or silenced their speech in violation of the First Amendment. In contrast, 
disputes over what this Article calls “governmental campaign speech” involve 
Free Speech Clause and other challenges by private parties who seek instead 
to silence the government’s speech on matters subject to vote by members of 
the public or their elected representatives. 
This Article thus explores when, if ever, governmental campaign speech on 
contested ballot and legislative measures is sufficiently dangerous to justify a 
departure from the general rule that the government’s own speech is insulated 
from Free Speech Clause review. This inquiry invites important and 
challenging questions about both the nature of government and the nature of 
speech, valuably forcing us to think about how government does, and should, 
work—as well as how speech does, and should, work. To this end, this Article 
reexamines the constitutionality of governmental campaign speech by 
incorporating perspectives offered by the emerging—but so far entirely 
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separate—constitutional debates over campaign finance reform and 
government speech. 
This Article contends that government speech on issue campaigns generally 
furthers, rather than frustrates, key First Amendment interests. Transparently 
governmental campaign speech often provides great value to the public: it 
enhances political accountability by informing voters of their governments’ 
priorities and preferences, provides a valuable heuristic for those who do not 
or cannot evaluate the competing arguments for themselves, and adds to the 
marketplace of available ideas and arguments, especially (but not only) as a 
counter to expression from powerful, private sources. 
The Article also identifies limits to its general proposition that the 
government’s campaign speech is constitutionally valuable. First, it 
emphasizes that the government should be permitted to assert the government 
speech defense to constitutional challenges to its campaign speech on 
contested ballot or legislative measures only when that speech is transparently 
governmental in origin—when the public can clearly identify the message’s 
governmental origins and thus hold the government politically accountable for 
its views. Second, it distinguishes government campaign speech that involves 
government’s endorsement of political candidates, concluding that 
governmental bodies’ campaign speech endorsing or opposing specific 
candidates raises greater threats to constitutional interests in preventing the 
self-perpetuation of incumbents and the entrenchment of political power. 
Finally, it highlights the availability of statutory and other nonconstitutional 
limits on government campaign speech, concluding that such constraints are 
constitutionally permissible yet often unwise as a policy matter in light of such 
expression’s great instrumental value to the public. It urges instead that 
policymakers carefully target such constraints to address specific instances of 
abusive government speech. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the most contentious First Amendment controversies in recent 
decades have been those over federal, state, and local government efforts to 
regulate private parties’ campaign speech. This longstanding debate features 
vigorous disagreements over whether private entities’ campaign speech is 
sufficiently unique to justify, if not require, special First Amendment rules.1 
Some argue that restrictions on private individuals’ or organizations’ campaign 
contributions or spending improve the quality of political speech by limiting its 
quantity,2 while others maintain that such constraints on expression’s quantity 
undermine the First Amendment interests of both speakers and listeners.3 
Contemporary First Amendment controversies also include those over the 
Supreme Court’s “recently minted” government speech doctrine,4 which has 
focused to date on untangling competing claims by public and private entities 
to the same expression.5 These disputes involve Free Speech Clause claims by 
private parties who argue that the government has impermissibly silenced, 
excluded, or punished their speech. The government, in turn, argues that it was 
instead speaking itself and thus entitled to prevent others from changing, 
joining, or otherwise garbling its own message.6 Whether the contested speech 
is characterized as private or governmental in origin drives the applicable—
and generally outcome-determinative—First Amendment analysis: although 
the Free Speech Clause constrains government’s power to regulate private 
speech,7 the Court has made clear that the government’s own speech is exempt 
from Free Speech Clause scrutiny.8 
 
 1 See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999) (exploring the possibility of First Amendment doctrine unique to expression 
concerning political campaigns and elections). 
 2 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903–04 (2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741 
(2008); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; 
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 
S. Ct. 876; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam). 
 3 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 893; Davis, 554 U.S. at 736; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134–40; 
Austin, 494 U.S. at 656; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15. 
 4 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 5 For a more extensive discussion of the Supreme Court’s brief history with government speech, see 
Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 904–16 (2010). 
 6 See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30. 
 7 E.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (recounting the First Amendment’s 
bar on government’s viewpoint-based discrimination against private speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even 
expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.” (citations omitted)); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove 
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Entirely overlooked in both sets of discussions, however, is the fact that the 
government frequently engages in issue-related campaign speech of its own on 
a variety of contested ballot and legislative measures. Indeed, such expression 
has generated considerable controversy at various times but has yet to be 
analyzed in light of contemporary First Amendment debates over the potential 
value and danger of private parties’ campaign speech (and governmental 
efforts to regulate it), as well as over the potential value and danger of 
government’s own speech more generally. The Court’s entirely separate 
“campaign speech” and “government speech” dockets have thus focused to 
date on claims by private parties that the government has impermissibly 
restricted or silenced their speech. In contrast, disputes over what I call 
“governmental campaign speech” involve Free Speech Clause and other 
challenges by private parties who seek instead to silence the government’s 
speech that expresses a position on matters subject to vote by members of the 
public or their elected representatives—pending ballot initiatives and 
referenda,9 as well as legislative measures.10 
For purposes of this Article, such “governmental campaign speech” means 
speech to the public (rather than to other government entities) that expresses 
 
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). 
 8 Under the Supreme Court’s government speech doctrine, the government’s own expression is insulated 
from Free Speech Clause challenges by plaintiffs who seek to alter or join that expression. See Summum, 129 
S. Ct. at 1131 (“If [public entities] were engaging in their own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech 
Clause has no application. The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does 
not regulate government speech. A government entity has the right to ‘speak for itself.’ . . . Indeed, it is not 
easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom.” (citations omitted) (quoting Bd. of 
Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000))); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 
(2005) (explaining that the government’s own speech is “exempt” from Free Speech Clause scrutiny); see also 
Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 (“When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to 
advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its 
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary 
position.”). 
 9 A referendum generally enables citizens to enact or reject statutes or constitutional amendments 
proposed by a legislature, while an initiative enables citizens to draft proposals themselves and submit them 
directly to the populace for a vote. Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. 
REV. 903, 904 (2006). 
 10 I acknowledge that many use the term “campaign speech” more narrowly to refer only to speech on 
matters subject to vote directly by the people themselves—ballot measures and candidate elections. As 
discussed in more detail below, however, my definition of government speech on “issue campaigns” also 
includes the government’s speech on pending legislation subject to vote by the people’s representatives, 
because a number of critics urge that such efforts pose constitutional threats very similar to the threats they 
perceive posed by the government’s speech on ballot measures to be decided directly by the people. See infra 
notes 41–46, 60–67, and accompanying text. 
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the official view of a governmental branch or body, such as speech issued 
collectively in the form of a resolution or proclamation, or speech by an 
official empowered to speak for that governmental entity. It does not include 
speech by individual government officials expressing their own views in a 
personal, nongovernmental capacity—e.g., when a governor endorses a 
particular candidate for Senate on her own time and without any expenditure of 
government resources. Moreover, as discussed in greater detail in Part III, this 
Article distinguishes between governmental speech on issue campaigns—
governmental speech that takes a position on a pending ballot or legislative 
measure—from governmental speech on candidate campaigns. 
Governmental speech on issue campaigns takes a wide variety of forms and 
may be delivered by a broad range of government speakers. Examples include 
not only government officials’ statements and press releases critical or 
supportive of pending ballot or legislative measures but also government 
agencies’ reports and analyses, as well as flyers, pamphlets, newsletter articles, 
online postings, and print and broadcast advertisements communicating their 
views of such measures to the public. 
Critics of such government expression (who include a variety of courts, 
policymakers, and commentators) argue that the government should refrain 
from taking sides in such contested policy contests. They maintain that the 
government’s campaign speech on ballot and legislative measures sufficiently 
differs from that of other participants in the political marketplace of ideas to 
require the government’s exclusion from that market, asserting more 
specifically that the government’s campaign speech undermines both speakers’ 
and listeners’ autonomy and equality interests. Controversies over such speech 
include those over the Eisenhower Administration’s advocacy on behalf of its 
proposed health care legislation,11 state human rights agencies’ 
communications in support of the Equal Rights Amendment,12 and local school 
boards’ expressive support for school bond measures.13 Such debates still rage 
today: the Fourth Circuit recently considered a First Amendment challenge to a 
public school board’s communications to potential voters in opposition to 
pending school voucher legislation,14 and a sharply divided Sixth Circuit 
recently rejected a similar challenge to a town’s use of public funds to express 
 
 11 See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 24–28 and accompanying text. 
 14 Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 277–80, 287–88 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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its position on ballot measures related to the local fire department’s financing 
and organization.15 
This Article seeks to reexamine longstanding controversies over 
governmental campaign speech by drawing upon lessons from contemporary 
First Amendment debates over campaign finance reform and government 
speech more generally. In so doing, it explores when, if ever, governmental 
campaign speech is sufficiently dangerous to justify a departure from the 
general rule that the government’s own speech is insulated from Free Speech 
Clause review.16 
To this end, Part I describes the spectrum of governmental campaign 
speech on pending ballot and legislative measures that critics have identified as 
potentially troubling. In so doing, it identifies two major strands of argument 
that appear in the various critiques of the government’s speech on issue 
campaigns. One strand involves a disagreement about the appropriate 
expressive role of government specifically, while the other involves a 
disagreement about the effects of campaign speech by powerful parties more 
generally. These disputes valuably force us to think about how government 
does, and should, work—as well as how speech does, and should, work. 
Part II responds to those critiques. In so doing, it reviews and renews this 
debate through the lens of the Court’s emerging government speech doctrine, 
as well as its campaign finance reform jurisprudence. It concludes that 
transparently governmental campaign speech on certain contested political 
issues—campaign speech on pending ballot or legislative measures that is 
clearly identified to the public as governmental in source—furthers, rather than 
frustrates, key First Amendment values and thus should not trigger any unique 
constitutional suspicion. More specifically, such expression enhances political 
accountability by informing voters of their government’s priorities and 
preferences, provides a valuable heuristic for those who do not have the time 
or expertise to evaluate competing policy arguments for themselves, and adds 
to the marketplace of available ideas and arguments, especially (but not 
exclusively) as a counter to less accountable and nontransparent expression 
from powerful, private sources. Indeed, government expression’s value in this 
 
 15 Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 621–22, 626 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 16 I am indebted to Joseph Blocher for his observation that this is an analysis of the possibility of an 
exception to an exception: whether government campaign speech should be excepted (by subjecting it to Free 
Speech Clause scrutiny) from government speech doctrine more generally, which itself is an exception to 
traditional First Amendment doctrine (by exempting the government’s own expression from Free Speech 
Clause scrutiny). 
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context may be particularly heightened in light of the current Supreme Court’s 
unwillingness in Citizens United v. FEC to permit limitations on campaign 
speech by corporate and other powerful, private interests.17 
Part III considers possible limits to this Article’s proposition that 
government speech on issue campaigns generally furthers key constitutional 
values and thus should not be understood to run afoul of the First Amendment. 
First, it emphasizes that government’s campaign speech on contested ballot or 
legislative measures should be considered consistent with the Free Speech 
Clause only when that speech is transparently governmental in origin—when 
the public can clearly identify the message’s governmental origins and thus 
hold the government politically accountable for its views. Second, it 
distinguishes government campaign speech regarding candidates, concluding 
that government entities’ speech endorsing or opposing specific candidates 
raises potentially greater threats to First Amendment interests in constraining 
the self-perpetuation of incumbents and the entrenchment of political power. 
Finally, it discusses the availability of statutory and other nonconstitutional 
limits on government speech on issue campaigns, concluding that those 
constraints are constitutionally permissible yet often unwise as a policy matter 
in light of government expression’s great instrumental value to the public. It 
urges instead that policymakers carefully target such constraints to address 
specific instances of abusive government speech. 
I. THE PERCEIVED CONSTITUTIONAL DANGERS OF GOVERNMENTAL 
CAMPAIGN SPEECH 
This Part briefly describes the concerns raised in longstanding debates over 
the dangers—or lack thereof—of government’s expressive participation in 
contested issue campaigns.18 Examples include those over state and local 
governments’ advocacy in support of or opposition to ballot measures to be 
voted on directly by the citizenry, as well as government entities’ advocacy in 
support of or opposition to measures to be voted on by a legislature. 
 
 17 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
 18 As discussed in greater detail in Part III, this Article distinguishes government speech expressing a 
position on contested issue campaigns from government entities’ speech endorsing or opposing a specific 
candidate or party. 
NORTON GALLEYSFINAL2.DOCX 4/10/2012 7:18 AM 
2011] CAMPAIGN SPEECH LAW WITH A TWIST 217 
A. Debates over Government Speech on Contested Ballot Measures 
Federal and state courts have long displayed deep suspicion of the 
government’s issue-related campaign expression. As discussed in detail below, 
for years they routinely upheld plaintiffs’ challenges to the government’s 
political advocacy in support of or opposition to pending ballot measures. 
Moreover, several of the opinions in the Supreme Court’s most recent 
discussion of government speech assumed, without citation or explanation, the 
existence of limitations on the government’s power to engage in certain 
political or partisan advocacy.19 
Note, however, that these courts did not consistently identify a clear legal 
source of their discomfort with the government’s campaign speech. While 
many grounded their resistance in state and local government law limiting the 
powers of state or local governmental bodies,20 others pointed to the Free 
Speech Clause and the Guarantee Clause, as well as other unidentified 
constitutional sources. For example, the California Supreme Court has 
suggested that public agencies’ expenditures to advocate for or against pending 
ballot measures “raise potentially serious constitutional questions.”21 More 
unequivocally, a Colorado federal court steeped its constitutional rejection of a 
school board’s power to expend funds to communicate with voters regarding a 
 
 19 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131–32 (2009) (“This does not mean that there 
are no restraints on government speech. . . . The involvement of public officials in advocacy may be limited by 
law, regulation, or practice.”); id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Finally, recognizing permanent displays 
on public property as government speech will not give the government free license to communicate offensive 
or partisan messages. For even if the Free Speech Clause neither restricts nor protects government speech, 
government speakers are bound by the Constitution’s other proscriptions, including those supplied by the 
Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses. Together with the checks imposed by our democratic processes, 
these constitutional safeguards ensure that the effect of today’s decision will be limited.”). 
 20 See, e.g., Rees v. Carlisle, 153 P.3d 1131, 1137–39 (Haw. 2007) (concluding that a prosecutor’s use of 
public resources to urge voters to support an amendment to Hawaii’s constitution violates state law interpreted 
to permit a prosecutor to offer comments but not to engage in express advocacy); Citizens to Protect Pub. 
Funds v. Bd. of Educ., 98 A.2d 673, 676–77 (N.J. 1953) (determining that a school board’s use of public funds 
to print a booklet urging voters to “Vote Yes” on a bond referendum was not within the power implied to the 
board by its express power to operate the schools); Porter v. Tiffany, 502 P.2d 1385 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) 
(finding no statutory authorization for a city water and electric board’s expenditure of funds for materials 
advocating support of election measures regarding nuclear power program participation and delay of 
construction of a nuclear power plant). 
 21 Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1976) (in bank); accord Vargas v. City of Salinas, 205 P.3d 207, 
226 (Cal. 2009) (discussing potential constitutional problems that may arise from the government’s use of 
public funds for speech in support of issue campaigns). 
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pending ballot measure in First Amendment rights to free speech and 
petition,22 as well as in Guarantee Clause concerns.23 
Regardless of the specific constitutional source of their discomfort with 
governmental campaign speech, critics generally voice one or both of two 
objections. Some urge that the government should refrain from seeking to 
persuade the public on such matters because its governmental status means that 
its voice will inevitably coerce listeners’ beliefs. Others also (or instead) argue 
that the government’s voice threatens to drown out or otherwise unfairly 
disadvantage dissenting speakers. The following examples illustrate these 
courts’ concerns in more detail. 
Among the earliest24—and subsequently most influential—objections to the 
government’s campaign speech on contested ballot measures was that by 
Justice-to-be William Brennan when he served on the New Jersey Supreme 
 
 22 See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. # 1, 459 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Colo. 1978) 
(“[A] grant of express authority for a partisan use of public funds in an election of this type would violate the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .”). 
 23 See id. at 361 (“When residents within a state seek to participate in this process by proposing an 
amendment to the state constitution, the expenditure of public funds in opposition to that effort violates a basic 
precept of this nation’s democratic process. Indeed, it would seem so contrary to the root philosophy of a 
republican form of government as might cause this Court to resort to [Article IV’s] guaranty clause . . . .”). 
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution—commonly known as the Guarantee Clause—provides that “[t]he 
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” U.S. CONST. 
art. IV, § 4. Although the Supreme Court has long held that Guarantee Clause claims are not justiciable, e.g., 
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–43 (1849), a number of judges reviewing challenges to government 
campaign speech on contested ballot measures have suggested that this holding should be revisited, see, e.g., 
Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 635–36 & n.5 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting that, 
because “ordinary democratic controls are insufficient as a remedy in situations where governmental influence 
threatens to undermine the independent political process” and “[g]overnmental advocacy and campaign 
expenditures could arguably threaten to undermine free and fair elections, could be coercive, and could 
reasonably undermine the reliability and outcome of elections where the government acts as a participant,” 
“[p]erhaps it is time for the Supreme Court to reconsider its Guarantee Clause jurisprudence”). 
 24 For other early examples of this trend, see Mines v. Del Valle, 257 P. 530, 536–37 (Cal. 1927) (in 
bank) (holding that the express municipal power to operate a public utility did not imply the power to 
appropriate funding to urge voters to approve a bond referendum to extend the utility), overruled by Stanson, 
551 P.2d 1; and Elsenau v. City of Chicago, 165 N.E. 129, 131 (Ill. 1929) (invalidating as an unauthorized 
municipal function a city’s expenditures for advertisements that “did not purport to be an impartial statement 
of facts for the information of the voters, but that . . . was an attempt, partisan in its nature, to induce the voters 
to act favorably upon the bond issues submitted at the election”). Some early courts bucked this trend, 
emphasizing the instrumental value of the government’s expression on ballot campaigns. E.g., City Affairs 
Comm. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 41 A.2d 798, 800 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1945) (“We think municipalities may, within their 
discretion and in good faith, present their views for or against proposed legislation or referendum to the people 
of questions which in their judgment would adversely affect the interests of their residents.”), aff’d, 46 A.2d 
425 (N.J. 1946). 
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Court.25 A school board had appropriated a few hundred dollars in public funds 
for the printing and dissemination of an eighteen-page booklet that urged 
voters to support a bond referendum that would finance the expansion of 
several school buildings—an expansion, the board maintained, necessary to 
ensure adequate educational facilities for the town’s children.26 In dictum27 that 
proved persuasive to many later courts, Brennan characterized the 
government’s advocacy as fundamentally unfair to those with different views: 
[T]he board made use of public funds to advocate one side only of 
the controversial question without affording the dissenters the 
opportunity by means of that financed medium to present their side, 
and thus imperilled the propriety of the entire expenditure. The 
public funds entrusted to the board belong equally to the proponents 
and opponents of the proposition, and the use of the funds to finance 
not the presentation of facts merely but also arguments to persuade 
the voters that only one side has merit, gives the dissenters just cause 
for complaint. The expenditure is then not within the implied power 
and is not lawful in the absence of express authority from the 
Legislature. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . We are persuaded, however, that simple fairness and justice 
to the rights of dissenters require that the use by public bodies of 
public funds for advocacy be restrained within those limits in the 
absence of a legislative grant in express terms of the broader power.28 
Many other courts thereafter similarly characterized the government’s 
participation in such debates as fundamentally unfair to dissenters.29 A Florida 
state court offered a typical analysis when upholding a challenge to a county’s 
 
 25 Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds, 98 A.2d 673. 
 26 Id. at 674. 
 27 The court determined the issue to be moot because the election had already occurred. Id. at 676 
(dictum) (“Plainly, then, any issues as to both the booklet and the radio broadcast are moot . . . . Nevertheless, 
the importance of the question makes appropriate our comment upon the actions taken.”). 
 28 Id. at 677–78 (dictum). 
 29 See, e.g., Palm Beach Cnty. v. Hudspeth, 540 So. 2d 147, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (“If 
government, with its relatively vast financial resources, access to the media and technical know-how, 
undertakes a campaign to favor or oppose a measure placed on the ballot, then by so doing government 
undercuts the very fabric which the constitution weaves to prevent government from stifling the voice of the 
people.”); Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 639 (Mass. 1978) (“Fairness and the appearance of 
fairness are assured by a prohibition against using public tax revenues to advocate a position which certain 
taxpayers oppose.”); Stern v. Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1975) (“It should be 
noted that by lending their support to the campaign underway for the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, 
defendants not only provide certain promotional and advertising assistance, but they endow that campaign with 
all of the prestige and influence naturally arising from any endorsement of a governmental authority.”). 
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expenditure of funds to promote passage of a referendum that would have 
created a unified county health care district: 
It is never in the public interest . . . to pick up the gauntlet and enter 
the fray. The funds collected from taxpayers theoretically belong to 
proponents and opponents of county action alike. To favor one side 
of any such issue by expending funds obtained from those who do 
not favor that issue turns government on its head and is the antithesis 
of the democratic process. 
. . . The appropriate function of government in connection with 
an issue placed before the electorate is to enlighten, NOT to 
proselytize.30 
Most of these cases involved challenges to the government’s advocacy with 
respect to pending initiatives and referenda involving the financing of public 
schools31 and other government services.32 But government entities’ advocacy 
in support of ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) triggered 
similar challenges and similar results. A New York state court, for example, 
expressed related objections when enjoining the state human rights agency 
from preparing flyers, pamphlets, and broadcast ads in support of a referendum 
to amend the state constitution to include the ERA.33 In so doing, the court 
suggested that such advocacy smacked of totalitarianism: 
As a State agency supported by public funds they cannot advocate 
their favored position on any issue or for any candidates, as such. So 
 
 30 Hudspeth, 540 So. 2d at 154. 
 31 See, e.g., Campbell v. Joint Dist. 28-J, 704 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1983) (concluding that a school 
district’s expenditures urging the approval of a financing proposal were unauthorized under state statute); 
Choice-in-Educ. League v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303 (Ct. App. 1993) (reversing the trial 
court’s grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining school board members from expressing opposition to a 
pending voucher proposal); Coffman v. Colo. Common Cause, 102 P.3d 999 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) 
(concluding that the secretary of state’s press releases opposing a statewide ballot initiative concerning school 
funding violated a state statute prohibiting public agencies from using more than fifty dollars in public monies 
to support or oppose ballot measures). 
 32 See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1976) (in bank) (considering a challenge to a state agency’s 
expenditures to urge support for increased parks funding); Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium 
Dist., 119 P.3d 624 (Idaho 2005) (concluding that a local government entity did not have statutory 
authorization to use public funds to support a ballot measure to approve the issuance of bonds to fund 
construction of the district’s convention center); Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 915 P.2d 336 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1996) (considering a taxpayer’s challenge to city officials’ expenditures of public funds to support a ballot 
measure to empower the city to acquire a private electric utility). 
 33 Stern, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239–40. For other examples of challenges to government speech that took sides 
on ballot measures outside of the government-financing context, see Rees v. Carlisle, 153 P.3d 1131, 1141 
(Haw. 2007); and King County Council v. Public Disclosure Commission, 611 P.2d 1227 (Wash. 1980) (en 
banc). 
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long as they are an arm of the state government they must maintain a 
position of neutrality and impartiality. 
It would be establishing a dangerous and untenable precedent to 
permit the government or any agency thereof, to use public funds to 
disseminate propaganda in favor of or against any issue or candidate. 
This may be done by totalitarian, dictatorial or autocratic 
governments but cannot be tolerated, directly or indirectly, in these 
democratic United States of America. This is true even if the position 
advocated is believed to be in the best interests of our country.34 
To be sure, most of these challenges focused on government agencies’ 
expenditures of public funds for expressive purposes, arguing that such 
publicly financed government speech unfairly disadvantaged dissenters in light 
of the government’s potentially greater resources, prestige, and power.35 These 
concerns foreshadow and parallel (without ever acknowledging) similar 
concerns about the dangers posed by unfettered campaign spending by well-
financed or otherwise-powerful, private parties. 
But some critics object to any governmental expression in contested issue 
campaigns that deviates from neutrality, regardless of whether the 
government’s expression involves the use of public monies. Examples include 
challenges to school board members’ remarks in opposition to a pending 
school voucher initiative36 and county council members’ vote to endorse an 
antipornography measure.37 Critics of such speech view the government’s 
sovereign role to require that it entirely refrain from taking sides in such 
debates because of the possibility that listeners might otherwise be particularly 
 
 34 Stern, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239. 
 35 See, e.g., Stanson, 551 P.2d at 9 (“A fundamental precept of this nation’s democratic electoral process 
is that the government may not ‘take sides’ in election contests or bestow an unfair advantage on one of 
several competing factions. A principal danger feared by our country’s founders lay in the possibility that the 
holders of governmental authority would use official power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their 
allies, in office; the selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of course, raises the specter of just 
such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral process.” (citations omitted)). 
 36 Choice-in-Educ. League, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303. Indeed, governments frequently express themselves on 
contested issues through resolutions and proclamations that require little, if anything, in the way of public 
expenditures. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 573, 584–86 (2008) (discussing congressional use of resolutions and other hortatory means to 
make declarations of policy). 
 37 King Cnty. Council, 611 P.2d at 1231. See generally Bruce W. Blakely, Comment, Public Utility Bill 
Inserts, Political Speech, and the First Amendment: A Constitutionally Mandated Right to Reply, 70 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1221, 1254 (1982) (“[I]t is the proper role of government to engage in informational speech. The state, 
however, may not employ a forum to engage in partisan expression. Government should not seek to influence 
initiatives or campaigns; nor are government editorials acceptable.”). 
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vulnerable to coercion.38 These critics object to the government’s campaign 
speech on any ballot measure that would be decided by the voters themselves, 
adopting the view that institutions of representative democracy should express 
no opinion on matters to be decided through direct democracy measures like 
ballot referenda or initiatives.39 Others modify this posture a bit, remaining 
sanguine about government entities’ advocacy in support of referenda they 
propose themselves, but objecting to such entities’ expressive opposition to 
ballot initiatives proposed by private citizens.40 
Some scholars have asserted parallel, and extremely broad, constitutional 
objections to the government’s departure from neutrality in contested policy 
debates. Robert Kamenshine, for example, proposed that courts should read the 
First Amendment to require “an implied prohibition against political 
establishment,” arguing that “participation by the government in the 
dissemination of political ideas poses a threat to open public debate that is 
distinct from government impairment of individual expression.”41 Professor 
Kamenshine downplayed the instrumental value—and highlighted the 
dangers—of the government’s policy advocacy in almost any context: 
Some may argue that the government has a compelling interest 
in stimulating support for its programs. The argument is that in order 
to operate effectively, the government must be able to advocate the 
 
 38 See Stanson, 551 P.2d at 9–10. 
 39 See id. (“[W]hile public agency ‘lobbying’ efforts undeniably involve the use of public funds to 
promote causes which some members of the public may not support, one of the primary functions of elected 
and appointed executive officials is, of course, to devise legislative proposals to attempt to implement the 
current administration’s policies. Since the legislative process contemplates that interested parties will attend 
legislative hearings to explain the potential benefits or detriments of proposed legislation, public agency 
lobbying, within the limits authorized by statute, in no way undermines or distorts the legislative process. By 
contrast, the use of the public treasury to mount an election campaign which attempts to influence the 
resolution of issues which our Constitution leave to the ‘free election’ of the people does present a serious 
threat to the integrity of the electoral process.” (citations omitted)); Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal 
Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535, 556–57 (1980) (“Cities are usually 
free to lobby before the legislature to prevent a measure from being put before the statewide electorate in 
referendum form. But once the state legislature decides to entrust the final legislative decision to the popular 
electorate, it explicitly removes the decision from the hands of state or municipal officeholders. Permitting 
those officials to use public funds to attempt to influence the outcome of that decision would partially return 
them to a role from which they have been excluded by constitutional design. Municipal governments should 
thus refrain from establishing an official political viewpoint during the time that the popular electorate, rather 
than its elected representatives, makes law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 40 See, e.g., Ala. Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 818 (N.D. Ala. 1988) 
(“While defendants might be forbidden to spend funds to support candidates, oppose initiative proposals, etc., 
they are not forbidden to publicize and seek public support for their own governmental proposals.”). 
 41 Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1104, 1104 (1979). 
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merits of its policies and programs. Institutional dissemination of this 
sort, however, conflicts with the goal of an open marketplace of 
ideas; it distorts public debate and thus raises serious establishment 
concerns.42 
Edward Ziegler similarly viewed the government’s expressive participation in 
contested policy debates as so unavoidably coercive as to threaten democratic 
functions: 
[A] characteristic distinguishing democratic from totalitarian 
government is that while a democracy attempts to facilitate and 
ascertain public opinion and establish policy in accordance therewith, 
an autocracy attempts to engineer public opinion in support of its 
decisions. . . . It is a truism that, if a governing structure based upon 
widespread genuine citizen opinions is to survive as a viable 
democracy, it must place legal restraints on the government’s ability 
to manipulate the formulation and expression of that opinion. 
. . . Although more subtle than censorship, official partisanship 
thorough [sic] the affirmative act of disseminating propaganda in 
support of a partisan viewpoint may pose as great or greater danger 
to political rights of free expression.43 
As an example of such objectionable partisanship, Professor Ziegler pointed to 
governmental efforts to urge support for ratification of the ERA.44 
In proposing to constrain government expression in an enormously wide 
range of settings, Professors Kamenshine and Ziegler staked out one of the far 
poles in the spectrum of views about the breadth of the government’s 
appropriate expressive function.45 Indeed, much of this debate can be traced to 
 
 42 Id. at 1116; accord id. at 1129, 1137 (“Under the prohibition of an implied political establishment 
clause, regulations that permit the dissemination of information to improve an agency’s image or to enhance 
support for its policies would be impermissible—both as to purpose and effect. . . . The political establishment 
clause would require balanced curricular and textbook treatment of the various viewpoints on race relations 
and women’s rights. It is possible that in some instances the government would design its textbooks and 
curriculum to present only a positive image of a particular group. Courts would have to prohibit such efforts, 
however, as a political establishment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 43 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 
21 B.C. L. REV. 578, 579–80 (1980) (footnote omitted). Professor Ziegler defined prohibited “official 
partisanship” for these purposes very broadly to include government speech on pending referenda, 
constitutional amendments, and legislative proposals. See id. at 581 n.12. 
 44 Id. at 583. 
 45 Indeed, the views of Professors Kamenshine and Ziegler may reflect not only a more limited view of 
government’s appropriate expressive functions but also an assumption that the coercive effect of the 
government’s voice is especially great because people generally trust and defer to their government. That 
assumption may be less valid today in light of evidence that voters are significantly more suspicious of the 
government than they once were. See, e.g., Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and 
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longstanding, and continuing, battles over what it is that the government 
should do. As Steven D. Smith has observed: 
What a government can properly say depends on the defined proper 
and essential role or function of the government. And issues of 
government speech are difficult—intractable, maybe—because there 
is no agreement about what government’s purpose and function is or 
is not. In this respect, controversies about government speech are 
merely symptoms of a deeper disagreement about the proper domain 
and role of government.46 
By no means, however, have these debates been entirely one-sided, as other 
courts and commentators have demonstrated considerably greater comfort with 
the government’s campaign speech in at least some contexts. For example, 
Justice Brennan himself later embraced the value of the government’s 
campaign speech when he sat on the United States Supreme Court.47 There—
years after repudiating the government’s persuasive efforts in support of 
contested ballot measures48—he stayed a state court’s order that had enjoined 
the City of Boston from spending public funds to urge support of a ballot 
referendum on residential and commercial property tax rates.49 This change of 
heart emerged shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling in First National Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti, which struck down, on First Amendment grounds, 
Massachusetts’s campaign finance law that had limited corporate campaign 
expenditures on pending ballot measures50—a ruling that newly empowered 
corporate participation in this debate and thus triggered Boston’s efforts to 
rebut such corporate speech. In determining that “the balance of the equities” 
justified a stay,51 Justice Brennan was among the first (and few) to see the link 
between government speech and campaign finance debates. He thus 
emphasized the value of the government’s voice in informing the voters on 
contested ballot measures—especially in countering powerful private speech: 
In light of Bellotti, corporate industrial and commercial opponents of 
the referendum are free to finance their opposition. On the other 
hand, unless the stay is granted, the city is forever denied any 
 
Trustworthiness, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 475, 476–85 (2000) (surveying social science literature documenting 
declines in political trust). 
 46 Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the Unnoticed 
Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 968 (2010). 
 47 City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389 (Brennan, Circuit Justice 1978). 
 48 See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 49 Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389. 
 50 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 51 Anderson, 439 U.S. at 1390. 
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opportunity to finance communication to the statewide electorate of 
its views in support of the referendum as required in the interests of 
all taxpayers, including residential property owners.52 
Still more controversies involving the ERA further illustrate competing 
views among the courts of the comparative costs and benefits of the 
government’s expressive participation in issue campaigns. Emphasizing the 
value as well as the inevitability of the government’s expressive participation 
in contested political debates, a California appellate court rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to a state women’s commission’s promotion of the 
ERA—and, indeed, rejected the possibility of the government’s expressive 
neutrality: 
The root problem with plaintiffs’ free speech contention is that it 
proves too much. They offer no point of distinction between 
government speech addressing the status of women and government 
speech on any other topic; save that they deem the topic of women’s 
status “controversial.” But, controversial or not, it is too late in the 
day to contend the economic and social status of women is not a 
legitimate topic of governmental concern. If the government, i.e., the 
Governor and legislative leaders, cannot appoint a commission to 
speak on the topic without implicating plaintiffs’ First Amendment 
rights it may not address any other “controversial” topics. If the 
government cannot address controversial topics it cannot govern.53 
Other courts similarly upheld the expenditure of public funds for expressive 
purposes as central to the government’s role and found no constitutional barrier 
to the expression of views by institutions of representative democracy on 
matters to be decided by the voters themselves through direct democracy.54 
Indeed, illustrating a considerably more expansive view of the government’s 
appropriate functions, at least one court directly refuted a presumption of 
neutrality by characterizing the government as having a duty to share its views 
on such measures with the public: “The City and its officials not only have the 
right, but the duty, to determine the needs of its citizens and to provide funds to 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 Miller v. Cal. Comm’n on the Status of Women, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877, 882 (Ct. App. 1984) (footnote 
omitted). 
 54 See, e.g., City Affairs Comm. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 41 A.2d 798, 800 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1945) (“We think 
municipalities may, within their discretion and in good faith, present their views for or against proposed 
legislation or referendum to the people of questions which in their judgment would adversely affect the 
interests of their residents. To accomplish this purpose we think they may incur expenditures by the 
publication of pamphlets, circulars, newspaper advertisements or radio addresses and that to do so is a proper 
governmental function.”), aff’d, 46 A.2d 245 (N.J. 1946). 
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service those needs.” The same court expressed “a serious doubt as to whether 
governmental entities should be required to stand silently by while 
propositions which can impact on their tax structures, funds, services and 
programs are voted upon, even if initiated by others; unless participation is 
statutorily forbidden by an appropriate authority.”55 
The majority opinion in Kidwell v. City of Union offers a recent example of 
this view—and is one of the first (and few) decisions to tie that view to the 
Supreme Court’s emerging government speech doctrine.56 There, a divided 
Sixth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to a city’s expenditures of 
public funds to express its views on various initiatives related to the 
restructuring and funding of the town’s fire department: “To hold that [the 
city’s] advocacy converts its treasury to a public forum would severely limit 
the town’s ability to self-regulate and would be tantamount to a heckler’s veto, 
where the government could not speak for fear of opening its treasury to the 
public.”57 Demonstrating that the constitutional debate over the government’s 
campaign speech remains live, however, dissenting Judge Martin strongly 
objected to the government’s expressive participation in any ballot measure as 
unconstitutionally straying from a governmental duty of expressive neutrality: 
“I believe that the Constitution properly prohibits the government from having 
a horse in the race when it comes to elections. When government advocates on 
one side of an issue, the ultimate source of governing power is shifted away 
from the people and the threat of official doctrine exists.”58 
B. Debates over Government Speech on Contested Legislative Matters 
As discussed above, most of the controversy to date has focused on 
challenges to public entities’ advocacy in support of or opposition to pending 
ballot measures to be decided by the voters themselves. But not all. Some 
critics of government speech also object to government entities’ speech to the 
public (as opposed to other government officials59) about issues to be decided 
 
 55 Ala. Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 817, 819 n.10 (N.D. Ala. 1988); 
accord Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 613 (1980) (“[I]t is arguably the function, 
and perhaps the duty, of public officials to speak out on all issues of the day . . . . Governments, then, can 
justify subsidizing the speech of public officials, not to reelect them or others, but because there is a substantial 
interest in hearing what they have to say.”). 
 56 462 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 57 Id. at 624. 
 58 Id. at 635 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 59 See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1976) (in bank) (noting that executive officials 
necessarily create legislative proposals to advance an administration’s policies). 
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by the legislature60—again citing concerns about the appropriate role of 
government and about coercion and unfairness to those with different views.61 
The First Circuit, for example, expressed its 1973 rejection of the 
government’s power to take sides in a contested policy debate in constitutional 
terms, upholding a First Amendment challenge to the Boston School Board’s 
decision to send notices to all Boston parents urging them to join a march and 
rally in opposition to pending busing legislation.62 More recently, the Fourth 
Circuit considered a constitutional challenge to a local school board’s 
advocacy of a proposed school voucher bill pending before the state 
legislature.63 Among other things, the plaintiff there objected to the school 
board’s voter-directed speech on pending legislation, arguing for First 
Amendment limits on a government body’s advocacy to voters—rather than to 
legislators—on a matter to be decided by the state legislature.64 The Fourth 
Circuit rejected his constitutional claim.65 
Congress has similarly debated the propriety of executive branch officials’ 
and agencies’ advocacy to the public on matters to be decided by the national 
Legislature. Although those critics generally root the constitutional source of 
their discomfort in separation-of-powers terms rather than in the First 
Amendment,66 the debates in great part parallel those over the government’s 
speech on contested ballot measures. In both, controversy swirls not only over 
the appropriate role of government—and when, if ever, that role demands 
neutrality or silence—but also over whether and when government speech 
poses dangers of coercion and unfairness.67 
 
 60 For a discussion of how voters considering ballot measures should be viewed as akin to legislators 
considering legislative measures, see Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2833 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 61 As explained supra note 10, this Article’s definition of “governmental campaign speech” includes 
government entities’ speech on legislative campaigns as well as ballot campaigns because some critics suggest 
that the government’s persuasive efforts with respect to matters subject to vote by legislators pose 
constitutional threats very similar to the threats they perceive posed by the government’s speech on matters 
subject to vote directly by the people themselves. 
 62 Bonner-Lyons v. Sch. Comm., 480 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1973). 
 63 Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 64 Id. at 287. 
 65 Id. at 288. 
 66 See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 67 This too is by no means a new debate over the scope of the government’s appropriate expressive role. 
Indeed, Jeffrey Tulis has exhaustively examined historical shifts in views about whether and when the 
President should speak directly to the public (rather than only to Congress) in support of or opposition to 
pending legislative matters. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987). After documenting the 
rarity with which eighteenth- and nineteenth-century presidents spoke directly to the people on policy matters, 
id. at 61–87, Professor Tulis then describes the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as 
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Indeed, congressional debates over efforts to regulate the government’s 
persuasive speech—termed by some as “propaganda”—in certain political 
contexts further illuminate the views of both critics and champions of such 
government campaign speech. Along these lines, David W. Guth has carefully 
documented longstanding controversies over the meaning and dangers of 
government “propaganda” that remain largely unresolved.68 One often-
articulated, but very broad, view characterizes government “propaganda” as 
any effort by the government to persuade its public listeners.69 Others instead 
characterize only the government’s covert,70 misleading,71 or monopolistic72 
persuasive efforts as “propaganda.” More specifically, Garth Jowett and 
Victoria O’Donnell describe distinctions between what some call “white 
propaganda” (transparent and accurate persuasive communications by 
government); “black propaganda” (deceptive and nontransparent governmental 
efforts to persuade); and “gray propaganda” (where the source and accuracy of 
the communications remain unclear).73 Once again, these competing 
definitions of “propaganda” reveal differing levels of discomfort with 
government’s expressive participation in certain political contests. 
 
developing appeals to popular rhetoric as “a principal tool of presidential governance” for the first time, id. at 
4. Of course, presidents now regularly appeal directly to the people at large, rather than to Congress, in 
soliciting support for legislative and other policy initiatives. I thank Jonathan Estin for directing me to this 
very helpful resource. 
 68 See David W. Guth, Black, White, and Shades of Gray: The Sixty-Year Debate over Propaganda 
Versus Public Diplomacy, 14 J. PROMOTION MGMT. 309 (2008). 
 69 See id. at 310 (noting that many use the term propaganda “as an umbrella covering all forms of 
persuasive communication, including advertising and public relations”). Although my focus here is on 
controversies over the government’s domestic “propaganda,” such definitional challenges play out in the 
international arena as well. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Propaganda for War and Transparency, 87 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 819, 821–28 (2010) (discussing varying definitions of “war propaganda” prohibited by international 
law and prosecuted in the Tokyo and Nuremberg war crimes trials). 
 70 See Guth, supra note 68, at 310 (noting that some distinguish between “revealed propaganda, 
messages that are overt in their effort to persuade, such as those in conventional advertising,” and “concealed 
propaganda, such as publicity generated from the distribution of news releases”). 
 71 E.g., Kelly Sarabyn, Prescribing Orthodoxy, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 367, 369 (2010). 
 72 See Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 380 (1983) 
(reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION 
IN AMERICA (1983)) (“Now it is true that propaganda is hardly a term of precise definition, but we usually use 
it when talking about totalitarian regimes whose propaganda is coupled with a rigid, if not absolute, 
suppression of any voice other than that of the state. The issues raised when the state is the only voice are 
significantly different from those raised when the state is one of many voices, especially when the other voices 
are unrestrained both in law and in fact.”). 
 73 GARTH S. JOWETT & VICTORIA O’DONNELL, PROPAGANDA & PERSUASION 17–20 (5th ed. 2012). 
Objections to government’s “propaganda,” however defined, may turn on the government’s target audience. 
For example, Guth describes a 1948 statute that “authorized the federal government to engage in a program of 
dissemination of truthful information to international audiences, while . . . prohibit[ing] the government from 
transmitting the same information to domestic publics.” Guth, supra note 68, at 312. 
NORTON GALLEYSFINAL2.DOCX 4/10/2012 7:18 AM 
2011] CAMPAIGN SPEECH LAW WITH A TWIST 229 
In response to various concerns about the potential dangers of such 
expression, Congress has regulated government “propaganda” on a number of 
occasions.74 For example, since 1951 each Congress has enacted an 
appropriations rider that entirely bars federal agencies from unauthorized 
expenditures to engage in “publicity or propaganda.”75 Never, however, has 
Congress defined this statutory term.76 
This proposal was initially spurred by members of Congress unhappy77 
with the Eisenhower Administration’s efforts to generate public support for its 
proposed health care legislation.78 In particular, the prohibition’s sponsors 
objected strenuously to, and characterized as potentially totalitarian, public 
speeches and other materials in support of the Administration’s bill by Oscar 
Ewing, the head of the U.S. Federal Security Administration (the federal 
 
 74 In 1942, for instance, Congress amended the Foreign Agents Registration Act to require agents of 
foreign principals who distribute “political propaganda” to ensure the material’s conspicuous labeling as such. 
Pub. L. No. 77-532, sec. 1, § 4(b), 56 Stat. 248, 255 (1942) (amended 1995). In enacting this requirement, 
Congress was spurred by concerns about the circulation of anonymous anti-American propaganda from Nazi 
sources in the years before and during World War II. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 2 (1937) (“This required 
registration will publicize the nature of subversive or other similar activities of such foreign propagandists, so 
that the American people may know those who are engaged in this country by foreign agencies to spread 
doctrines alien to our democratic form of government, or propaganda for the purpose of influencing American 
public opinion on a political question. . . . We believe that the spotlight of pitiless publicity will serve as a 
deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda. We feel that our people are entitled to know the sources of 
any such efforts . . . .”). Decades later, a plaintiff who sought to exhibit Canadian films on acid rain and 
nuclear war challenged the statute on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the Act’s labeling requirements 
with respect to “propaganda” included a pejorative connotation that deterred him from exhibiting the films 
under such terms. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 467–68 (1987). After discussing the wide variety of 
available definitions of the term “propaganda,” id. at 477–78, the Supreme Court ultimately—and 
controversially—concluded that the labeling requirements did not burden speech (and thus posed no First 
Amendment problem) because Congress intended no pejorative connotation when using the term in the Act, id. 
at 484–85. Congress amended the statute in 1995 to replace the term “political propaganda” with 
“informational materials.” Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, sec. 9, § 614(a)–(c), 109 
Stat. 691, 700. 
 75 Jodie Morse, Note, Managing the News: The History and Constitutionality of the Government Spin 
Machine, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 843, 853 (2006) (quoting 97 CONG. REC. 4098 (1951)). 
 76 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3. 
 77 Powerful, private interests like the American Medical Association were unhappy as well. See Harry M. 
Marks, Revisiting “The Origins of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions,” 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 109, 112–13 
(1995) (describing the American Medical Association’s hostility toward Oscar Ewing and his efforts). 
 78 See, e.g., OSCAR R. EWING, THE NATION’S HEALTH: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 12–13 (1948) (“In 
the face of these and the other proofs given in this report that further rapid improvement in national health can 
be achieved only by concerted effort, and that the need for increased Federal action is imperative, I have 
reached the considered conclusion that more extensive and efficient Nation-wide planning is the only effective 
way to accomplish a significant betterment in national health.”); id. at 18 (“I am compelled to urge, as strongly 
as I know how, that the Congress enact, as President Truman has recommended, a system of Government 
prepayment health insurance in the terms in which it has been mapped out in [the report].”). 
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agency that served as the precursor to today’s Department of Health and 
Human Services).79 Ewing’s advocacy triggered a debate over the value and 
danger of executive branch speech that remains unresolved today. 
More specifically, congressional supporters of the propaganda ban objected 
to executive branch officials’ advocacy to the public on an issue pending 
before the legislative branch as not only potentially coercive of public opinion 
but also offensive to the appropriate separation of powers.80 The original 
congressional debate over the proposed rider thus centered on whether a 
prohibition on undefined propaganda would interfere with the government’s 
responsibility to inform the public about its programs,81 or instead would 
simply prevent the government from adopting what some characterized as 
coercive governance tactics.82 The latter view prevailed, and the propaganda 
ban passed without any definition of the prohibited speech. The ban has 
remained in place as an appropriations rider for the many decades since its 
initial adoption. 
Despite this longstanding ban, executive branch agencies and officials, of 
course, regularly continue to speak to the public about a wide variety of 
 
 79 See Legislative Activities of Executive Agencies: Hearings Before the H. Select Comm. on Lobbying 
Activities, 81st Cong. 338–39 (1950) (statements of Charles A. Halleck & Clarence J. Brown, Members, H. 
Select Comm. on Lobbying Activities) (disparaging Ewing’s efforts in “sell[ing] that particular piece of 
legislation” as “mak[ing] speeches and spread[ing] the philosophy of socialism and Government 
dictatorship”). 
 80 See id. at 341 (statement of Clarence J. Brown, Member, H. Select Comm. on Lobbying Activities) 
(“[Y]ou have certain administrative responsibilities, but the Constitution does not give you any authority to 
attempt to make law. It restricts that authority to no one else in the world but to the Congress of the United 
States. The President does not have any authority to make law, nor should he have. He sometimes tries to 
exercise it, however.”). 
 81 See 97 CONG. REC. 4098 (1951) (statement of Rep. Sidney R. Yates) (“Would not the effect of the 
gentleman’s amendment in using the word ‘propaganda’ jeopardize publication by the Children’s Bureau of 
pamphlets pertaining to the training and growth of children?”); id. at 4099 (statement of Rep. John E. Fogarty) 
(“We do not even know what the gentleman calls propaganda. We do not know what he calls the right type of 
publicity or the wrong type of publicity. That is the fault I find with this amendment.”); id. at 4100 (statement 
of Rep. John E. Fogarty) (“Here you are limiting the amount of publicity and propaganda which may be issued 
by any agency of government in this bill and yet you do not define in the amendment what propaganda is or 
what publicity is.”). 
 82 See id. at 4099 (statement of Rep. George Meader) (“[The propaganda prohibition] is necessary to 
strengthen the Congress in the interest of formulating national policy by the people themselves. It is a corollary 
to that principle that public opinion ought not to be subjected to influence and direction by the executive 
agencies, the administrative branch of the Government, in the manner that it is today. In a democracy, where 
public opinion rules in the long run, the media of communication: the press, the radio, television, and the 
printed word, are very potent weapons in the control of the affairs of this country.”). 
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matters, legislative and otherwise.83 Indeed, the office charged with monitoring 
the ban’s enforcement—the Government Accountability Office (GAO)—has 
defined the ban narrowly and identified violations very rarely.84 In so doing, 
the GAO has emphasized the value of executive branch expression: 
Our decisions reflect societal values in favor of a robust exchange of 
information between the government and the public it serves. This 
includes the right to disseminate information in defense of an 
administration’s point of view on policy matters. 
Accordingly, as part of our efforts to strike the right balance, we 
have historically afforded agencies wide discretion in their 
informational activities.85 
More specifically, absent any statutory definition of prohibited government 
propaganda, the GAO has interpreted the ban to prohibit only a federal 
agency’s “self-aggrandizement” or “puffery” (i.e., materials that “emphasize 
the importance of the agency or one of its officials”); federal agency activities 
that are “purely partisan in nature” (i.e., that are “designed to aid a political 
candidate or party”); and “covert propaganda” (i.e., materials that do not 
disclose their governmental source).86 Emphasizing government expression’s 
great instrumental value to the public, moreover, the GAO has construed even 
 
 83 For discussion of the inevitability of executive speech on such matters, see, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, 
Bush, Obama and Beyond: Observations on the Prospect of Fact Checking Executive Department Threat 
Claims Before the Use of Force, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 433 (2010); and Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, 
The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 84 As the agency charged generally with monitoring public expenditures, the GAO is the administrative 
body nominally responsible for attending to the “propaganda rider.” Morse, supra note 75, at 859; accord 1 
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS 
LAW 4-198 (3d ed. 2004). The GAO, however, has only a purely advisory function and no direct enforcement 
power. Morse, supra note 75, at 859. At most, the GAO makes findings and can refer its determinations to 
Congress or other governmental bodies for further investigation. Id. 
 85 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-302504, MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003—USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR FLYER AND PRINT AND TELEVISION 
ADVERTISEMENTS 7 (2004) (citations omitted). Along these lines, the GAO has declined to characterize the 
government’s expressive activities as prohibited “propaganda” as long as they “are reasonably related to the 
agency’s duty to inform the public of agency actions, programs, and policies, or justify and rebut attacks upon 
its policies.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-316443, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—RETIRED 
MILITARY OFFICERS AS MEDIA ANALYSTS 8 (2009); accord U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra, at 13 (“To 
restrict all materials that have some political content or express support for an Administration’s policies would 
significantly curtail the recognized and legitimate exercise of the Administration’s authority to inform the 
public of its policies, to justify its policies and to rebut attacks on its policies. It is important for the public to 
understand the philosophical underpinnings of the policies advanced by elected officials and their staff in order 
for the public to evaluate and form opinions on those policies.”). 
 86 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-319075, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES—
USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR “HEALTHREFORM.GOV” WEB SITE AND “STATE YOUR SUPPORT” WEB PAGE 
7–8 (2010). 
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those categories narrowly87 and has been further reluctant to find violations 
other than in cases of covert government promotion of its programs or 
policies.88 
Recent controversies, however, have renewed attention to the propaganda 
ban, its definitional deficiencies, and its lack of enforcement. Examples include 
the Department of Education’s contract with newspaper columnists to produce 
op-eds supporting the Bush Administration’s “No Child Left Behind” initiative 
without disclosing the Department’s sponsorship,89 as well as the 
Administration’s briefing of and other close involvement with retired military 
personnel who then appeared on television as private military analysts offering 
their view of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.90 These developments triggered 
new (but so far unsuccessful) congressional efforts not only to define 
prohibited government “propaganda” for the first time but also to define it very 
broadly.91 Indeed, although the public controversies themselves focused on 
allegedly covert governmental speech—persuasive speech sponsored by the 
government that did not disclose its governmental origins—congressional 
critics responded with the introduction of bills that proposed much more 
sweeping restrictions on executive branch speech on legislative matters.92 
 
 87 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 85, at 2 (“Application of the prohibition is 
necessarily balanced against an agency’s responsibility to inform the public about its activities and programs, 
explain its policies and priorities, and defend its policies, priorities, and point of view.”). 
 88 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-305368, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION—CONTRACT 
TO OBTAIN SERVICES OF ARMSTRONG WILLIAMS 14 (2005) (“Every agency has a legitimate interest in the 
‘dissemination to the general public . . . of information reasonably necessary to the proper administration of 
the laws’ for which the agency is responsible. However, while we agree that the Department should 
disseminate information to the public on the NCLB Act, it must disclose its role.” (citations omitted) (quoting 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-106139, APPROPRIATIONS—LIMITATIONS—PUBLICITY AND PROPAGANDA 
PROHIBITION—LABOR–FEDERAL SECURITY APPROPRIATION ACT, 1952 (1952))). 
 89 See id. at 1. 
 90 David Barstow, Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2008), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html?_r=3&scp=1&sq=hand+of+pentagon&st=nyt&oref=slogin
&oref=slogin. The GAO’s 2009 report found that the program did not violate the propaganda ban. See U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 85, at 2 (“Clearly, DOD attempted to favorably influence public 
opinion with respect to the Administration’s war policies in Iraq and Afghanistan through the RMOs [Retired 
Military Officers]. However, as we discuss below, and based on the record before us in this case, we conclude 
that DOD’s public affairs outreach program to RMOs did not violate the prohibition. We found no evidence 
that DOD attempted to conceal from the public its outreach to RMOs or its role in providing RMOs with 
information, materials, access to department officials, travel, and luncheons. Moreover, we found no evidence 
that DOD contracted with or paid RMOs for positive commentary or analysis.”). 
 91 For example, legislation introduced in the Senate in 2005 would have prohibited, inter alia, any 
executive branch expression “designed to support or defeat legislation pending before Congress or any State 
legislature” other than testimony at legislative hearings. S. 266, 109th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2005). 
 92 See, e.g., S. 266. 
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This Part has documented longstanding debates over the comparative value 
and dangers of the government’s expressive participation in contested policy 
debates. The next Part joins this debate. 
II. EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL DANGERS OF 
GOVERNMENTAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH ON CONTESTED POLICY ISSUES 
This Part identifies and responds to two major strands of argument that 
appear in the various critiques of the government’s campaign speech on 
contested ballot and legislative measures. Critics offer both sets of arguments 
to support the claim that constitutional values are best protected by silencing 
the government’s speech in such contexts.93 I suggest that one strand involves 
a disagreement about the appropriate expressive role of the government 
specifically, while the other involves a disagreement about the effects of 
campaign speech by powerful parties more generally. These disputes valuably 
force us to think about how the government does, and should, work—as well 
as how speech does, and should, work. 
More specifically, the first critique focuses on the government as speaker, 
objecting to governmental deviations from neutrality or silence on certain 
matters. My response here draws in great part from debates over government 
speech more generally (i.e., government speech outside of the campaign 
context). 
The second critique focuses instead on the effects of campaign speech by 
especially powerful speakers, governmental or otherwise. My discussion here 
draws in great part from ongoing debates over the effects of speech by private 
parties in the campaign context and whether the dangers of such speech or of 
its regulation pose the greater threat to First Amendment values. More 
specifically, Kathleen Sullivan has helpfully described the debate over the 
constitutionality of campaign finance reform as a clash between competing 
views of the First Amendment.94 One envisions free speech as “serving the 
 
 93 Such a claim—that some speech should be restricted to facilitate free speech values—may seem novel 
from a First Amendment standpoint but, of course, is not without some precedent. For example, the debate 
over the First Amendment implications of campaign finance regulation in part turns on a debate over whether 
the First Amendment protects speech (in which case, government restrictions on corporations’ campaign 
speech are suspect) or certain speakers (in which case, corporate campaign speech might be permissibly 
regulated to prevent drowning out the speech of protected speakers). See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts 
of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 155, 158 (2010) (discussing implications of the debate over 
whether the First Amendment protects speech or speakers). 
 94 Sullivan, supra note 93. 
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interest of political liberty,” treating “with skepticism all government efforts at 
speech suppression that might skew the private ordering of ideas. And on this 
view, members of the public are trusted to make their own individual 
evaluations of speech, and government is forbidden to intervene for 
paternalistic or redistributive reasons.”95 The other approach to the First 
Amendment envisions free speech rights as “serv[ing] an overarching interest 
in political equality,” which primarily embraces an antidiscrimination principle 
that protects dissenters and other marginal speakers from disadvantage.96 
Under this view, “politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation but 
regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech.”97 
With this as background, we can understand critics of government 
campaign speech as variously arguing that such expression offends both liberty 
and equality values implicated by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. 
First, critics share a concern that the government’s campaign advocacy 
threatens a liberty-based conception of the First Amendment because they 
perceive it as inherently coercive of listeners’ beliefs due to the government’s 
sovereign status.98 Second, even if government persuasion falls short of 
actually coercing listeners, critics fear that the government’s voice remains 
sufficiently powerful to threaten First Amendment equality interests by 
drowning out or otherwise unfairly disadvantaging dissenting speakers.99 
After considering each of these critiques, this Part ultimately rejects both, 
concluding that the government’s expressive participation in contested issue 
campaigns generally furthers, rather than frustrates, key First Amendment 
values.100 
A. Responding to Critiques of the Government as Speaker 
A number of critics object to any persuasive efforts by government 
speakers on matters subject to vote by members of the public; some critics also 
object to government speech to the public on matters subject to vote by the 
 
 95 Id. at 145. 
 96 Id. at 144. 
 97 Id. at 145. 
 98 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 99 See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text. 
 100 Note that this Article does not maintain that the government has a First Amendment right to speak, but 
instead that government speech does not violate the Free Speech Clause because its expression furthers, rather 
than frustrates, key First Amendment values. As discussed in more detail below, that the government is not a 
First Amendment rights holder itself leaves open the possibility that its speech could be constrained through 
statute or other nonconstitutional means. See infra notes 209–12 and accompanying text. 
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people’s elected representatives. These objections are rooted in a specific 
theory of government and its appropriate role, rather than (as discussed 
later101) in a theory that speech by powerful parties more generally inflicts 
harm in the campaign context. 
1. Government Persuasion Can Be Parsed from Government Coercion 
Central to this critique is the notion that the government is unique among 
all speakers because of its potentially coercive power as sovereign—its power 
to apply “sufficient pressure . . . to compel a certain course of action.”102 
Recall that the values at the heart of the Free Speech Clause include an interest 
in protecting individual liberty from government coercion.103 Liberty-based 
arguments usually focus on whether the government is undermining individual 
autonomy and self-expression by punishing private speakers for their views.104 
Such liberty-based arguments take different form in the context of 
governmental campaign speech, however, where critics seek to silence the 
government for fear that otherwise the government’s expressive efforts will 
coerce listeners’ beliefs and expression. In other words, as described above, 
some see the government’s persuasive voice on campaign matters as inherently 
and inevitably coercive—potentially even posing threats of totalitarianism.105 
 
 101 See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text. 
 102 Ekow N. Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1195, 
1216 (2008); accord id. at 1199 (“Asserting that the law is coercive isolates a particular way it treats people; 
namely, the law imposes a non-voluntary normative system on people.”); id. at 1218 (“Coercion is normally 
claimed when one has been forced by another to act, or refrain from acting, against their will. Coercive 
pressure can overcome one’s will and make a particular course of action unreasonably costly. For example, 
where coercive pressure is applied to Bob, that pressure would render one or more of his options unreasonably 
costly. Coercive pressure in this respect makes a particular option unreasonable but not necessarily 
impossible.” (footnote omitted)). 
 103 The First Amendment’s primary purposes are most often identified to include protecting individual 
interests in autonomy and self-expression, furthering citizen participation in democratic self-government, and 
contributing to the discovery of truth and the development of knowledge. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils 
of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 
1405, 1411 (1987); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 
422, 423 (1980). 
 104 See supra note 7. 
 105 See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text; see also Brian C. Castello, Note, The Voice of 
Government as an Abridgement of First Amendment Rights of Speakers: Rethinking Meese v. Keene, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 654, 676 (“When the public perceives the government as having expert knowledge of an issue or 
unrivaled control over a matter, the government communication may command even greater respect and faith. 
Respect for the government, reliance on the accuracy of its statements, and fear of challenging its authoritative 
word might cause citizens to withdraw, to a certain extent, from their duties of self-governance. As a result, 
government would coerce, rather than earn, the majority’s consent.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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To be sure, governmental efforts at thought control would be anathema to 
the First Amendment.106 But just as not all exercises of a sovereign’s power are 
coercive, the government’s persuasive expression by itself is not inevitably 
manipulative.107 In other words, as Abner Greene has explained, that the 
government represents—and, in fact, is—authority does not mean that its 
persuasive efforts are necessarily coercive.108 
Although he did not address the government’s campaign speech 
specifically, Professor Greene has thoughtfully demonstrated that government 
speech in general threatens individual liberty only in those rare instances when 
it is monopolistic or coercive. He explains coercion as “choice under a kind of 
pressure that allows us fairly to say, ‘she did not choose; she was 
compelled.’. . . Although there are difficult cases at the margin, we generally 
accept the distinction between coercion and persuasion, deeming action 
pursuant to persuasion a proper exercise of autonomy.”109 As he observes: 
 
 106 See Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values 
Inculcation, and the Democratic–Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 67 (2002) (“[T]he notion of 
thought control is inconsistent with the concepts of free thought and mental autonomy that render the exercise 
of the free expression right meaningful.”); id. at 75 (“[A] foundational strategy of any sophisticated totalitarian 
society is to control the minds of its citizens, thereby destroying individual mental autonomy.”); Sarabyn, 
supra note 71, at 369 (“[Prescribing orthodoxy] fails to treat citizens as free and autonomous, and essentially 
appoints the state itself as the supreme judge of ideological truth, reproducing its ideological views in the 
citizenry by deploying coercion.”). 
 107 See STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 21 (2d ed. 2005) (describing power as including 
“coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation,” and distinguishing “coercion,” which means that “A 
secures B’s compliance by the threat of deprivation where there is ‘a conflict over values or course of action 
between A and B’” from “influence,” which “exists where A, ‘without resorting to either a tacit or an overt 
threat of severe deprivation, causes [B] to change his course of action’” (alteration in original) (quoting PETER 
BACHRACH & MORTON S. BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 24, 30 (1970))); see also 
Schauer, supra note 72, at 384–85 (“If . . . we view the first amendment as primarily or exclusively protecting 
individual self-expression, self-realization, self-fulfillment, or something of that sort, then it is hard to see how 
government speech could be a first amendment problem. When we focus on communicators or listeners not 
instrumentally but as the end result of our concern, the fact that the government may be speaking is of little 
moment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 108 See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2000) (“No choice is made 
exogenously to the various authority structures in which one lives (e.g., government–citizen, parent–child, 
spouse–spouse, friend–friend, human being–God, etc.). We make choices under the influence of many whom 
we consider authorities . . . . [W]e must accept choice in a web of power relations. We must deem 
nonautonomous only those choices made under the influence of particularly overbearing power, and not 
simply because of deference to authority, be it of the state or of any other person or corporate entity.”). 
 109 Id. at 41–42. The Supreme Court has recognized the difference between coercive and persuasive 
speech in the private context as well—for example, by interpreting the First Amendment to permit statutory 
restrictions on private parties’ speech that rises to the level of regulable conduct because of its coercive effects. 
See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (“[I]n-person solicitation may exert 
pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or 
reflection.”); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618–20 (1969) (“If there is any implication that an 
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[O]ne of the basic principles underlying the strong protection of 
private speech is that the persuasive effect of speech is not a proper 
reason for regulation. Only when there is no time for 
counterargument, or when persuasion will not cure the original harm, 
do we permit regulation of speech. 
We should think no differently about government speech. 
Assuming that dissent is open, and assuming no monopolization, we 
should consider even quite persuasive government speech to be just 
that, quite persuasive, and hold fast the distinction between 
persuasion and coercion.110 
To illustrate the difference between the government’s coercive and 
persuasive efforts, recall Wooley v. Maynard, where the Supreme Court held 
that New Hampshire could not require an objecting private speaker to display 
the state’s motto on his car’s license plate.111 As the Court held, punishing an 
individual for refusing to deliver the government’s chosen message constitutes 
governmental coercion, undermining a dissenting individual’s liberty by 
forcing her to express views with which she disagrees.112 But Wooley also 
suggests the additional proposition that the government retains the power to 
express its own views and values, so long as it does not force others to join or 
share those views; indeed, the Wooley Court raised no quarrel with New 
Hampshire’s expressive choice to feature its motto “Live Free or Die” on the 
state’s license plates, only with its efforts to coerce dissenters to display the 
motto against their will.113 
To further illustrate the distinction between government persuasion and 
government coercion, contrast the government’s various policy responses to 
the health risks created by smoking. The Surgeon General’s 1964 report on the 
dangers of tobacco offers an example of government persuasion, rather than 
 
employer may or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities 
and known only to him, the statement is . . . a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, 
and as such without the protection of the First Amendment. . . . [E]mployees, who are particularly sensitive to 
rumors of plant closings, take such hints as coercive threats rather than honest forecasts.” (footnote omitted)); 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (“The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an 
overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties 
without interference from threats of physical violence.”). 
 110 Greene, supra note 108, at 43 (footnote omitted). 
 111 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977). For further examples of government coercion of individual expression, see 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990); and Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355–56 
(1976) (plurality opinion). 
 112 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715. 
 113 See id. at 713; see also id. at 717 (“The State is seeking to communicate to others an official view as to 
proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism. Of course, the State may legitimately pursue 
such interests in any number of ways.”). 
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coercion: the public was free to read it, or not; those who read it were free to 
change their smoking habits, or not.114 The public is similarly free to accept, 
reject, or entirely ignore government speech on contested issue campaigns. In 
contrast, the government’s requirement that tobacco companies post warnings 
on cigarette packages and advertisements115 is coercive (albeit potentially still 
constitutional as a factual disclosure required of a commercial speaker to 
ensure adequate consumer information): tobacco companies face fines116 and 
other sanctions117 if they fail to comply.118 
As another example, some expressive settings may offer the potential for 
coercing listeners’ beliefs or behavior. For instance, the government appears to 
be acting more as a regulator than as just another participant in the marketplace 
of ideas when it speaks without disclosing its message’s governmental origins: 
its deception as to the source of its message suggests an effort to mislead the 
public into giving the message greater credibility than it would otherwise.119 
Because purposefully masking a message’s governmental source may improve 
its reception in certain circumstances, government manipulation of the public’s 
attitudes toward its views by deliberately obscuring its identity as the speaker 
smacks more of coercion than simple persuasion.120 
The government’s monopolistic speech to a captive audience also raises the 
possibility of coercing listeners’ beliefs or behavior, in that listeners may not 
be free to avoid, resist, or counter the government’s message.121 Indeed, 
concerns of this type may explain at least some of the initial controversy when, 
 
 114 See PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING AND 
HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
(1964). 
 115 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). 
 116 Id. § 1338. 
 117 Id. § 1339. 
 118 Although government coercion of private parties’ speech raises substantial First Amendment issues, 
such regulation is not always unconstitutional—especially in the context of commercial speech like cigarette 
labels and advertisements. See, e.g., Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532 
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (holding that such regulation of commercial speech satisfies the First Amendment because it 
is sufficiently tailored to meet a substantial government interest). 
 119 See Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1009–15 
(2005); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). 
 120 See Lee, supra note 119, at 984–88. 
 121 See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 
939 (2009) (suggesting a constitutional right against government-compelled listening, especially in contexts 
that raise captive-audience concerns like state-mandated abortion counseling or diversity training); Redish & 
Finnerty, supra note 106, at 99 (identifying free speech concerns with respect to government speech in public 
schools that seeks to indoctrinate “a captive audience of undeveloped and impressionable minds”). 
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shortly after his inauguration, President Obama announced plans to deliver a 
speech to be broadcast to all public schools122—a controversy that largely 
evaporated upon disclosure of the speech’s apolitical content.123 In evaluating 
whether and when government expression is coercive, Professors Redish and 
Finnerty have similarly emphasized the importance of context: 
As a general matter, no one worries that the government is 
seeking to “indoctrinate” adults when, for instance, the President 
gives his State of the Union address or some administrative agency 
issues a report on an issue of national concern. The reasons are 
obvious: Adults are not a captive audience compelled to listen to the 
government’s speech, and often another party presents competing 
speech as a countermessage. Moreover, although young minds are 
not fully developed and presumably are more susceptible to 
indoctrination because they lack the ability to think critically and 
evaluate messages, we presume adults are capable of analyzing the 
variety of messages they hear on a daily basis.124 
But contemporary debates over ballot measures or legislative proposals 
rarely, if ever, involve government’s monopolistic speech to a captive 
audience. Recall that governmental campaign speech generally takes the form 
of government officials’ statements and press releases critical or supportive of 
pending ballot or legislative measures, as well as government agencies’ reports 
and analyses, flyers, pamphlets, newsletter articles, website postings, and print 
and broadcast advertisements communicating their view of such measures to 
the public. In none of these contexts is the audience captive, nor is there any 
paucity of opportunity for dissent and counterargument.125 
 
 122 See Joshua Rhett Miller, Critics Decry Obama’s ‘Indoctrination’ Plan for Students, FOXNEWS.COM 
(Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/09/02/critics-decry-obamas-indoctrination-plan-
students/. 
 123 See Obama Urges Students to Work Hard, Stay in School, CNN.COM (Sept. 8, 2009, 7:17 PM), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/08/obama.school.speech/index.html. 
 124 Redish & Finnerty, supra note 106, at 90. 
 125 Indeed, monopolistic government speech is increasingly unlikely given changes in communications 
technology that enable more speakers to participate, expanding opportunities for dissent and counterspeech. 
See Schauer, supra note 72, at 380 (“Although the quantity of government speech is no doubt increasing, and 
technological advances may make it possible for the government to convey its messages more efficiently, we 
should not forget that concomitant increases and improvements in private sector communication probably 
match this development. There seems to be no evidence whatsoever that the proportion of government speech 
within the total universe of communication is increasing. In fact, it seems quite possible that it is decreasing.”). 
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In short, there remains a meaningful distinction between government 
coercion and government persuasion.126 That the government acts as both 
regulator and as speaker does not mean that we cannot parse those roles for 
constitutional purposes.127 
2. Expectations of the Government’s Expressive Neutrality Are Unwise and 
Unrealistic 
Not only is the government’s expressive neutrality unnecessary to prevent 
government coercion and protect individual autonomy, but expectations of 
such neutrality are also generally impracticable. Numerous scholars have 
directly (and, in my opinion, powerfully and effectively) challenged the notion 
that the government’s role as sovereign requires its neutrality on contested 
issues. Joseph Tussman, for example, observed that “[t]he danger in the 
careless use of notions of neutrality and non-partisanship is that the concern for 
fairness may be taken as requiring the relinquishing of commitment.”128 More 
recently, Abner Greene urged that “government in a liberal democracy not 
only may promote contested views of the good, but should do so, as well.”129 
As Steven Smith noted, “[T]here is nothing inherently problematic about 
 
 126 Although I see a real distinction between the government’s persuasive and coercive speech, I am 
considerably more skeptical that another distinction proposed by some courts—permitting the government’s 
informational or factual but not persuasive expression—is meaningful. See, e.g., Harrison v. Rainey, 179 
S.E.2d 923, 925 (Ga. 1971) (authorizing expenditures for a legal memorandum on the effects of, but not for 
advocacy materials regarding, a proposed state constitutional amendment); Rees v. Carlisle, 153 P.3d 1131, 
1138–39 (Haw. 2007) (interpreting a statute to permit the government’s informational but not persuasive 
speech on a pending ballot measure); Stern v. Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 239–40 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 
1975) (suggesting that the government’s “factual” speech on the ERA, but not its advocacy in support of the 
proposal, is legally permissible). Efforts to distinguish between “factual” and persuasive speech face often-
insuperable challenges because the speaker’s most basic choices about her “factual” presentation can be 
intentionally and effectively persuasive, depending on quantity, order, contrast, tone, etc. See Martin H. Redish 
& Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary 
Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1338–39 (2009) (“[I]t 
is . . . impossible to separate information from opinion because the use of information is often a central 
element in the persuasive nature of opinion. . . . [I]nformation is often conveyed, not as an end in itself, but 
rather as part and parcel of an effort to employ the system of public discourse to achieve certain normative and 
personal goals.”). 
 127 See Alan K. Chen, Right Labels, Wrong Categories: Some Comments on Steven D. Smith’s Why Is 
Government Speech Problematic?, DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 12, 2010, 9:14 AM), http://www. 
denverlawreview.org/government-speech/2010/8/12/right-labels-wrong-categories-some-comments-on-steven-
d-smit.html (“First Amendment doctrine appropriately distinguishes between the[] two scenarios because the 
government’s own speech can rarely influence the public debate in the same qualitative or quantitative way as 
when it excludes private speakers’ ideas from the marketplace.”). 
 128 JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 80 (1977). 
 129 Greene, supra note 108, at 2. 
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government speech, even on matters about which citizens energetically 
disagree,”130 and as Alan Chen observed, “[N]eutrality would forbid the 
government ever to adopt a policy, which is the function of government in the 
first instance.”131 
I join these commentators in rejecting the contentions of Professors 
Kamenshine, Ziegler, and other government speech critics132 that the 
government should—or indeed, could, as a practical matter—remain neutral on 
contested policy matters. Such a thin conception of the government’s 
appropriate functions is neither wise as a matter of policy nor realistic as a 
matter of observing and describing how democratic governments actually 
work.133 Indeed, the government’s noncoercive speech generally furthers the 
other values most often identified at the heart of the First Amendment: 
facilitating participation in democratic self-governance by informing voters of 
their government’s priorities and encouraging the discovery of truth and 
dissemination of knowledge by adding to the marketplace of ideas. 
For these reasons, expectations of the government’s expressive neutrality 
are now a dead letter as a matter of constitutional law outside the campaign 
context because the Supreme Court’s emerging government speech doctrine 
acknowledges that the government inevitably has views that the Constitution 
permits it to express. Indeed, even those Justices skeptical of the majority’s 
approach to government speech nonetheless also reject the premise that the 
First Amendment bars government from spending money to articulate a view 
with which some (or even many) taxpayers disagree.134 Recognizing that an 
effective government must take positions on a wide variety of matters, even the 
 
 130 Smith, supra note 46, at 952. 
 131 Chen, supra note 127. 
 132 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 133 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern times, at 
least) innumerable subjects—which is the main reason we have decided to elect those who run the 
government, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary.”). 
 134 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005); id. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The 
first point of certainty is the need to recognize the legitimacy of government’s power to speak despite 
objections by dissenters whose taxes or other exactions necessarily go in some measure to putting the 
offensive message forward to be heard. To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment 
heckler’s veto of any forced contribution to raising the government’s voice in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ would 
be out of the question.” (footnote omitted)). 
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dissenters agreed that private speakers can constitutionally be compelled to 
pay for government speech from which they dissent.135 
Although this subpart has concluded that expectations of the government’s 
expressive neutrality are generally both unwise and unrealistic, the possibility 
remains that certain government speech in certain contexts threatens specific 
dangers that may justify its constraint. This leads to the next question of 
whether there are specific dangers posed not by the government’s deviation 
from expressive neutrality generally, but instead by the government’s deviation 
from expressive neutrality in the campaign context specifically. In considering 
this question, the remainder of this Part draws from lessons learned in parallel 
debates over when, if ever, private speakers’ persuasive efforts in the campaign 
context should be considered sufficiently threatening to First Amendment 
values to justify their regulation. 
B. Responding to Critiques of Powerful Parties’ Campaign Speech 
Some critics perceive governmental campaign speech on pending ballot or 
legislative measures as repugnant to an equality-based view of the Free Speech 
Clause. In other words, they see the government’s campaign speech as tilting 
the playing field to its advantage because the government’s greater power, 
prestige, and resources may ultimately change actual political outcomes in 
ways that are fundamentally unfair to dissenting speakers. They fear that this is 
especially, but not only, the case when government campaign speech is 
supported by public funds for printing, dissemination, and other costs. Note 
that this objection is a critique of the instrumental effects of campaign speech 
by powerful actors generally, where government is among those powerful 
actors. In other words, whereas the arguments described in the preceding 
subpart focused on the government as a unique speaker because of its 
sovereign status, the arguments explored in this subpart focus on campaign 
 
 135 See id. In considering this First Amendment challenge to a generic beef promotion campaign 
implemented by the Department of Agriculture and funded by taxes targeted at beef producers, the Johanns 
majority and dissenters differed vigorously, however, on the question whether government must identify itself 
as the source of that speech to successfully assert the government speech defense to the plaintiffs’ free speech 
claim. Compare id. at 562 (majority opinion) (“When . . . the government sets the overall message to be 
communicated and approves every word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the 
government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources in developing 
specific messages.”), with id. at 571–72 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]f government relies on the government-
speech doctrine . . . , it must make itself politically accountable by indicating that the content actually is a 
government message, not just the statement of one self-interested group the government is currently willing to 
invest with power.”). 
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speech by powerful parties, without necessarily emphasizing their 
governmental or nongovernmental status. 
Recall that the First Amendment is often understood to protect speech 
(especially political speech) not only to protect the individual liberty interests 
of potential speakers but also to serve certain instrumental goals by ensuring 
listeners’ access to views that will inform their decisions (and especially their 
political decisions).136 As Professors Redish and Mollen explain: 
[P]ublic opinion cannot be formed without the evaluation and 
ultimate acceptance of certain ideas over others, the listener 
participates in the formation of public opinion as much as the speaker 
does. Just as the speaker may benefit by contributing to public 
discourse, so too may listeners’ moral and intellectual horizons be 
expanded by the receipt of information and opinion. Their ability to 
function as active participants in a democracy is improved as a result. 
More importantly, government’s decision to insulate citizens from 
information and opinion because of a paternalistic distrust of their 
ability to make wise choices is as threatening to core democratic 
values as the suppression of any speaker.137 
To achieve these instrumental aims, First Amendment theory thus often 
assumes the “rational actor” model that the more speech from all sources, the 
better for listeners’ ultimate decision making.138 Under this view, one party’s 
speech does not threaten the equality interests of other speakers because all are 
free to compete in the marketplace of ideas. 
 
 136 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948) 
(“The final aim of the [town] meeting is the voting of wise decisions. The voters, therefore, must be made as 
wise as possible. The welfare of the community requires that those who decide issues shall understand them. 
They must know what they are voting about. And this, in turn, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and 
interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented to the meeting. . . . What is essential is not 
that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”); Redish & Mollen, supra note 126, 
at 1307 (“[A] valid democratic theory of the First Amendment must protect all speech that allows individuals 
to discover their personal needs, interests, and goals—in government and in society at large—and to advocate 
and vote accordingly.”); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (recognizing “the paramount 
public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants”). 
 137 Redish & Mollen, supra note 126, at 1337 (footnotes omitted). 
 138 As Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky explains, “[T]he modern trend . . . has been to assume that audiences are 
savvy and sophisticated, capable of sorting through masses of information to discover truth, however 
provisional or contested. Indeed, these assumptions underpin two articles of faith in modern First Amendment 
theory: (1) audiences are capable of rationally evaluating the truth, quality, credibility, and usefulness of core 
speech without the aid of government intervention; and (2) more speech is better than less.” Lyrissa Barnett 
Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 810–11. 
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On the other hand, many skeptics remain unconvinced that more speech 
inevitably improves listeners’ decision making.139 This skepticism is illustrated 
by longstanding efforts to regulate private parties’ campaign speech, which are 
equality-focused efforts based in part on the premise that certain powerful 
speakers’ political expression will overwhelm or otherwise undermine the 
views of dissenting speakers.140 
This divide over the accuracy of the rational actor model (and thus over the 
comparative benefits and dangers of powerful parties’ campaign speech) in 
many ways mirrors that described by Daniel Ortiz in understanding voters 
either as “civic smart[ies]” (“individuals [who] make highly informed political 
choices” after carefully acquiring and sorting available information) or as 
“civic slob[s]” (passive and uniformed voters who do not engage in the same 
cognitive effort, instead relying largely on “images, feelings, and 
emotions”).141 Although one need not rely on the pejorative “slob” to conclude 
that many time-strapped voters rely on shortcuts to help inform their decisions, 
one’s view of the instrumental value and dangers of campaign speech (by any 
speaker, private or governmental) turns in great part on one’s assessment of 
how listeners process speech of this type. 
For those who identify a—and perhaps the—primary First Amendment 
value as facilitating participation in democratic self-governance,142 the key 
question then becomes whether the government’s expressive participation in 
debates over ballot and legislative measures furthers or frustrates that aim. The 
remainder of this Part explores how the government’s campaign speech can 
help inform the decisions of both informed and comparatively uninformed 
voters without threatening the equality interests of other speakers. 
 
 139 See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge 
to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 892, 892 (1984) (“A central though rarely articulated 
premise of many election laws and much democratic theory is that electoral outcomes should be rational rather 
than irrational—that they should reflect the true, reasoned, and informed choice of the people. Unfortunately, 
as political scientists have shown, people do not always vote rationally.”). 
 140 See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to 
Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 640 (1982) (“When the forum is limited by physical, 
technological, or economic factors, the messages of some speakers must be limited if all points of view are to 
be heard, so that the audience may enjoy a full range of uninhibited debate.”). 
 141 Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Under the First 
Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995). Professor Ortiz himself finds both models incomplete. Ortiz, supra. 
 142 See, e.g., Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011) 
(“[T]he best possible explanation of the shape of First Amendment doctrine is the value of democratic self-
governance.”). 
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1. Governmental Campaign Speech Can Provide Valuable Information for 
Comparatively Sophisticated Voters 
Government expression can valuably further citizens’ capacities to 
participate in democratic self-governance by enabling them to identify and 
assess—positively or negatively—their government’s priorities and 
performance.143 For these reasons, as I have urged elsewhere,144 the primary 
value of government speech turns not on its popularity or even its wisdom,145 
but instead on its transparency—when members of the public can actually 
identify the government as the message’s source, “maximiz[ing] prospects for 
meaningful credibility assessment and political accountability.”146 Examples of 
transparency in this context include speeches made by or quotes attributed to 
specified government officials in their official capacity, as well as press 
releases, reports, pamphlets, online postings, and advertisements by identified 
government agencies. In this way, government expression provides great 
instrumental value because of what it offers its listeners: information that 
furthers the public’s ability to evaluate its government.147 
Moreover, the government’s voice may be particularly knowledgeable on 
some issues, potentially adding valuable new perspectives to the ideas and 
 
 143 See, e.g., 2 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, GOVERNMENT AND MASS 
COMMUNICATIONS 723 (1947) (“Now it is evident that government must itself talk and write and even 
listen.”); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698 (1970) (“Participation by the 
government in the system of freedom of expression is an essential feature of any democratic society. It enables 
the government to inform, explain, and persuade—measures especially crucial in a society that attempts to 
govern itself with a minimum use of force. Government participation also greatly enriches the system; it 
provides the facts, ideas, and expertise not available from other sources.”); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. 
Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 565 (1996) (“From the 
perspective of democratic theory, it is essential that these government employees inform the populace of the 
government’s policies and initiatives. Because the government informs the populace about its functioning 
through these subsidies, it facilitates self-government by providing members of the community with 
information and data on which to judge the performance of its political leaders. As a result, the electorate is 
better able to check elected officials and hold them accountable.”); Shiffrin, supra note 55, at 604 (describing 
government speech as providing the public with “the advantage of knowing the collective judgment of the 
legislature and of knowing the views of its representatives, which would in turn be useful for evaluating 
them”). 
 144 See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ 
Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009); see also Norton & Citron, supra note 5. 
 145 Recall, as just one of many examples, the insights into government policymaking provided to the 
public by the Pentagon Papers (a Department of Defense study that reviewed U.S. military and diplomatic 
policy in Indochina). See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (rejecting 
the government’s efforts to stop publication of the Pentagon Papers). 
 146 Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
587, 632 (2008). 
 147 Id. 
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arguments available for voters’ consideration.148 Indeed, because many 
initiatives and referenda directly implicate government services and their 
financing, affected governmental bodies may have unique expertise to offer 
voters on the merits of such measures. Consider, as just one example, a series 
of three 2010 Colorado ballot measures generated by private parties that 
proposed to cut at least a billion dollars annually in state taxes (and thus 
government funding).149 Supporters characterized the measure as “forc[ing] the 
government to operate more efficiently and cut bloated spending.”150 In 
response, the state’s governor joined business leaders to urge voters to reject 
the measures, arguing that they could have a devastating effect on the state 
economy that “would set Colorado back a generation.”151 More specifically, 
“[Governor] Ritter pledged to rally against the three ballot measures at every 
speech he gives until the vote in November,”152 “call[ing] them ‘three of the 
most backward-thinking ballot measures this state has ever seen.’”153 The point 
is not that the government’s views are necessarily correct, but instead that they 
may provide value to voters by exposing the views of those who would be 
charged with implementing the measure if enacted. 
Those who are inclined to characterize listeners as “civic smarties” should 
thus be especially comfortable with the addition of the government’s voice to 
the marketplace of ideas in contested policy debates because the government’s 
campaign expression contributes to the information available to voters for 
consideration.154 
 
 148 Id. at 589–90. 
 149 See Steve Raabe, Ritter Bashes Tax-Cut Initiatives, DENVER POST, May 14, 2010, at A1. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 152 Aldo Svaldi, Political Foes Turn Partners, DENVER POST, May 24, 2010, at A18. 
 153 Editorial, Candidates Weigh In on Right Side of Ballot Items, DENVER POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at D3. 
 154 The Supreme Court has noted on several occasions the informational value of private parties’ 
campaign speech with respect to contested ballot measures when rejecting limitations on such speech. See 
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981) (“Whatever may be the state 
interest . . . in regulating and limiting contributions to or expenditures of a candidate[,] . . . there is no 
significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure.”); First Nat’l Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for 
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, 
or individual.”). 
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2. Governmental Campaign Speech Can Provide a Valuable Heuristic for 
Comparatively Uninformed Voters 
The government’s campaign speech may also offer great benefit even to 
those inclined to adopt the “civic slob” model when describing voters’ 
behavior. Transparently governmental speech provides a valuable heuristic, or 
cognitive shortcut, for those with neither the time nor the expertise to analyze 
the competing arguments themselves. Indeed, a significant body of evidence 
suggests that reliance on heuristics may enable comparatively uninformed 
voters to vote as “competently”—to vote in a way consistent with their own 
policy preferences—as comparatively well-informed voters.155 
As Michael Kang argues specifically with respect to ballot measures: 
[T]he source of voter confusion in direct democracy is not political 
ignorance or heavy campaign spending, as commonly alleged, but the 
scarcity of “heuristic cues” . . . . [S]trengthening heuristic cues in 
direct democracy offers the best means of rehabilitating voter 
competence pragmatically, at low cost, without trying to force voters 
to adjust the way they think about politics.156 
Among the most effective of these heuristics is knowledge of the opinions 
of trusted—or distrusted—third parties, who might include experts, community 
leaders, and government speakers. As a general illustration of government as 
comparatively trusted speaker, recall the Surgeon General’s report on the 
dangers of tobacco, which responded to the tobacco industry’s well-financed 
 
 155 See, e.g., James N. Druckman, Does Political Information Matter?, 22 POL. COMM. 515, 515 (2005) 
(summarizing a study finding that “citizens can compensate for a lack of political information by using 
shortcuts to make the same decisions they would have made if they had that information”—“that many poorly 
informed voters (who lacked knowledge about the initiatives’ details) used elite endorsements (e.g., from 
interest groups) to emulate the behavior of well-informed . . . voters”); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct 
Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 
1141, 1161 (2003) (“[R]eliance on heuristic cues is a learned practice based on past success and accuracy. 
Voting behavior in candidate elections, when heuristic cues are readily available, is relatively rational, 
consistent, and well-ordered, whereas in issue elections, particularly when heuristic cues are difficult to find, 
voting behavior appears more random, irrational, and contradictory. Without heuristic cues, voters in direct 
democracy are more confused, [and] money is more influential . . . . Even if they do not cure voter confusion 
in every instance, voters armed with heuristic cues will be much more likely to vote competently in the face of 
complexity than will voters without them.” (footnote omitted)). For a more critical assessment of heuristics’ 
value to voters, see Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme 
Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 703–06 (2010). 
 156 Kang, supra note 155, at 1141; accord id. at 1164–65 (“[M]uch of the electorate is rationally ignorant 
and unlikely to become more engaged in a way that cures concerns about voter confusion. . . . Heuristic cues 
quickly put uninformed voters on roughly equal footing with better-informed voters, even if they do not 
transform civic slackers into infallible or perfectly informed voters.”). 
NORTON GALLEYSFINAL2.DOCX 4/10/2012 7:18 AM 
248 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:209 
speech.157 This dynamic proves accurate in the campaign context as well, as 
Professor Kang explains: 
Underlying policy specifics are less useful to the average citizen than 
knowing the synthesized opinion of a trusted leader. As a result, 
when they know what an identifiable politician thinks about an issue, 
people report a great deal more certainty about their own attitude, 
compared to when they based their attitude purely on policy 
information. 
. . . . 
A normative endorsement of heuristic reasoning thus flows from 
a realistic acknowledgment of the central role that political elites play 
in American politics. It is a wishful endeavor to pray that citizens can 
become better individual democrats, without also considering the 
powerful function of politicians, activists, interest groups, and other 
elites. . . . In short, citizens depend on political elites to gather 
political information and synthesize deliberative judgments for 
them.158 
Providing voters access to the government’s transparently sourced views on 
often-confusing ballot measures thus provides the public with a potentially 
valuable heuristic.159 
Again, government’s views are by no means necessarily wise, popular, or 
persuasive; instead, they simply provide considerable heuristic value to voters 
who know whether their values align with those of the government speaker.160 
Whether the government’s views persuade or dissuade any particular voter 
depends on whether that voter views the government speaker with trust or 
distrust.161 Indeed, some number of voters will always disagree with the 
government. 
 
 157 See, e.g., PUB. HEALTH SERV., supra note 114 (describing the adverse health effects of smoking). 
 158 Kang, supra note 155, at 1161–62. 
 159 See id. at 1169 (“People have plentiful access to political information, but otherwise busy and semi-
interested voters need information disseminated to them in a way that requires them to take no affirmative 
steps or do anything more than they otherwise would do. Unless campaign finance information is delivered to 
voters at virtually no cost to them, such information may never reach them and will always remain too difficult 
for voters to acquire. Voters must be made aware of such heuristic cues to take advantage of them.”). 
 160 See Schauer, supra note 72, at 385 (“In the face of almost completely unrestrained criticism of 
government from all quarters, . . . views about the ability of government to use speech to falsify consent seem 
to require such a negative view of popular competence as to call into question the very reasons for considering 
democracy or majoritarianism to be any good at all.”). 
 161 See, e.g., June Fessenden-Raden et al., Providing Risk Information in Communities: Factors 
Influencing What Is Heard and Accepted, SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES, Summer/Fall 1987, at 94, 96 (finding 
that the trust people have in political institutions varies, as does their trust in the information provided by such 
governments); Schauer, supra note 72, at 381 (“[A]ntigovernment biases may be so great, particularly with 
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3. Governmental Campaign Speech Can Provide a Valuable Response to 
Campaign Speech from Powerful, Private Sources 
Government speech, moreover, can be especially important to an equality-
based conception of free speech when its voice counters that of powerful, 
private speakers.162 This remains especially true in the specific context of 
often-confusing ballot measures, where the government’s expression not 
infrequently counters that of powerful, private interests. Indeed, government 
expression’s ability to further the First Amendment’s democracy-enhancing 
purposes may now be particularly heightened in light of the current Supreme 
Court’s unwillingness to permit limitation on the quantity of political speech 
from corporate and other private interests. In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court 
held that the First Amendment prohibits efforts to regulate corporations’ 
independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates for office.163 
Emphatically rejecting equality-based arguments that such regulations 
justifiably protect the marketplace of ideas from distortions due to the 
disproportionate volume of speech from wealthy speakers,164 the majority 
refused to characterize certain speech as unusually dangerous based on its 
(corporate) source.165 
Now that the quantity of corporate political speech is largely unregulated, 
government expression that counters that of private interests may prove 
especially valuable to both informed and comparatively uninformed voters. For 
 
reference to the veracity of political leaders, that much government speech may encounter a public strongly 
predisposed to disbelief.”); Leigh Contreras, Comment, Contemplating the Dilemma of Government as 
Speaker: Judicially Identified Limits on Government Speech in the Context of Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 27 
N.M. L. REV. 517, 539–40 (1997) (“[V]oters may tend to defer to the government’s judgment—although the 
assumption that government has an especially influential effect on the people depends on the public’s 
reverence and respect for government.” (footnote omitted)). 
 162 Abner Greene has made this point about government speech more generally, outside of the specific 
campaign context that is the focus of this Article. See Greene, supra note 108, at 9, 11 (“[G]overnment speech 
often makes a distinctive contribution to public debate. If the government’s point of view were simply 
corroborative of private points of view, the affirmative argument for government speech would weaken as the 
concerns about government power rise. . . . Moreover, government persuasion on a contested matter plays an 
important role in countering private power. As one locus of power in society, government can check 
agglomerations of private power, just as checks on government ensure that it be only one voice among many. 
Additionally, even in a contested arena government speech can help foster debate, fleshing out views, and 
leading toward a more educated citizenry and a better chance of reaching the right answer.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 163 130 S. Ct. 876, 908–09 (2010). 
 164 Id. at 904–05. 
 165 Id. at 905. For arguments that Citizens United was wrongly decided even if one focuses on a liberty-
based view of the First Amendment, see Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign 
Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010). 
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example, in the 2008 election cycle, the governor of Colorado engaged in a 
“statewide ‘Truth Tour’” aimed at countering the arguments by powerful, 
private opponents of a ballot measure to end a tax credit for the oil and gas 
industry.166 The governor’s advocacy came in response to assertions by the 
amendment’s opponents, who included oil and gas companies and the Denver 
Metro Chamber of Commerce, that terminating the tax credit would “drive oil 
and gas companies to other states. That move will negatively impact 
Colorado’s economy, taking away jobs and adversely affecting those cities and 
towns that rely on the industry.”167 Again, the point is not that the 
government’s views are necessarily correct, but instead that they may provide 
value by responding to speech from powerful, private parties that might 
otherwise not face effective rebuttal.168 
Along these lines, the government’s campaign speech may also be 
especially important given the frequent use of ballot measures by powerful, 
private parties to seek to restrict minority rights. Consider, as just one of many 
examples, the California Real Estate Association’s 1964 proposed ballot 
measure to repeal the state’s fair housing law that prohibited racial 
discrimination in the sale or lease of property.169 Opposed to any “open 
housing” laws,170 the real estate association started with one hundred thousand 
dollars in “seed money.”171 Opponents of the measure included not only a wide 
variety of civil rights and other private groups but also California Governor Pat 
Brown172 and Senator Pierre Salinger.173 
 
 166 Gayle Perez, Ritter: Amendment 58 Foes Using Scare Tactics, PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (Oct. 10, 2008), 
http://www.chieftain.com/news/local/ritter-amendment-foes-using-scare-tactics/article_e7c5ae2f-0d70-56e4-
a4cb-26096f2209ee.html (“Ritter said the amendment will not raise taxes, but simply removes the tax credit 
that oil and gas companies have been receiving from the state for more than three decades. Of the money the 
state will keep from those credits, at least 60 percent will be devoted to providing financial aid to low-income 
resident[] students who attend a state public college or university. The remaining money will be used for 
wildlife habitat protection, renewable energy grants and to local communities impacted by oil and gas 
industry.”). 
 167 Cari Merrill, Dems Make Case for 58, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN, Sept. 27, 2008, at A11. 
 168 See, e.g., DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON SCIENCE 
THREATENS YOUR HEALTH 85–90, 201 (2008) (documenting efforts by tobacco companies to contest claims of 
the health hazards of cigarettes and by oil companies to cast doubt on scientists’ claims on the role of fossil 
fuels in contributing to climate change). 
 169 See California: Proposition 14, TIME, Sept. 25, 1964, at 23, 23, available at http://www.time.com/ 
time/magazine/article/0,9171,876158-1,00.html. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Totton J. Anderson & Eugene C. Lee, The 1964 Election in California, 18 W. POL. Q. 451, 470 (1965). 
 172 Id. at 470–71. 
 173 California Proposition 14, supra note 169, at 23. 
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Of course, government speakers are not monolithic in their views on this or 
any other issue. Three decades later, California Governor Pete Wilson and 
University of California Regent Ward Connerly were among the governmental 
speakers that supported Proposition 209, a ballot proposition that amended the 
state constitution to prohibit state and local governments’ affirmative action 
programs in California.174 Again, the point is simply that the government’s 
voice adds to those available to voters collecting information about pending 
ballot measures. 
Not only are ballot measures often the subject of campaign speech by 
powerful and well-financed private parties,175 but the identity of such 
powerful, private parties may not be clear, obscuring the public’s efforts to 
assess such speakers’ self-interest and credibility: 
Interest groups strategically obscure their involvement when they 
believe identification would hurt their campaigns. Many industry 
groups form political committees to conduct campaign activities 
under nondescript names like “Californians for Paycheck Protection” 
(religious conservatives supporting limitations on labor union 
political activity), “Alliance to Revitalize California” (Silicon Valley 
executives supporting a tort reform measure), and “Californians for 
Affordable and Reliable Electrical Service” (industry opponents of 
utility regulation).176 
Similarly, advocates for statewide initiatives seeking to ban all forms of 
affirmative action named themselves the “American Civil Rights Institute,” an 
identifier that at least some voters may have found confusing.177 
 
 174 Pete Wilson et al., Argument in Favor of Proposition 209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: 
GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 5, 1996, at 32 (1996), available at http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/Vote96/html/BP/ 
209yesarg.htm. 
 175 See Kang, supra note 155, at 1148 (“Many direct democracy elections, particularly on economic 
measures, attract spectacular disparities in campaign spending between opposing and supporting sides. Indeed, 
the consensus from empirical research is that spending advantages are nearly outcome-determinative when 
aimed at defeating a ballot measure.”). 
 176 Id. at 1158–59. 
 177 See Chris Chambers Goodman, (M)Ad Men: Using Persuasion Factors in Media Advertisements to 
Prevent a “Tyranny of the Majority” on Ballot Propositions, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 257 
(2010) (“The [organizations’] names are specifically designed, in some[] cases to obfuscate, and these names 
of the supporters can be very influential in the outcome of the ballot measure.”); see also Bruce E. Cain, 
Commentary, Garrett’s Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1592–93 (1999) (“Many of the groups that succeed 
in getting initiatives on the ballot have primarily economic motives—e.g., insurance companies, lawyers, and 
teachers’ unions. To make matters worse from an informational perspective, these groups often adopt false, 
generic labels such as ‘Committee for a Just America’ or ‘Campaign for Consumer Justice.’ . . . In an ideal 
world, information heuristics would operate like warning labels on consumer items. In reality, those who 
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For these reasons, voters often cannot be sure of the source of private 
campaign speech and are thus deprived of a key cue to the expression’s 
credibility. These dynamics invite a wide range of policy proposals designed to 
enhance transparency in the campaign speech context.178 Indeed, the Citizens 
United majority itself invited legislatures to pass transparency-forcing 
requirements with respect to private campaign speech.179 Whether Congress or 
state legislatures do so, however, is a matter of political will subject to 
jurisdictional and temporal variation.180 And even when enacted, such 
requirements still remain vulnerable to constitutional challenge because the 
Court has held that disclosure requirements are subject to “exacting” 
scrutiny.181 The government’s voice on ballot issues may thus prove especially 
valuable to voters—both informed and uninformed—by responding to private 
power that sometimes operates in nontransparent ways. 
Not only is private speech often nontransparent, but it is unaccountable to 
the public in other ways. For example, courts frequently interpret the First 
Amendment to protect false political speech by private speakers.182 The 
government’s counterspeech again may serve a valuable checking function.183 
For all these reasons, government speech can be understood to further an 
 
sponsor initiatives know that labels can be important, and they choose labels strategically in order to create 
images they think voters will receive best.”). 
 178 See Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343, 381–86 (2010) (proposing legislative 
measures to address voter deception); Goodman, supra note 177, at 294–301 (offering a series of proposals to 
require greater transparency of the source of private speech in direct-democracy campaigns). 
 179 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (“The Government may regulate corporate 
political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech 
altogether.”). 
 180 See David G. Savage, Corporate Campaign Spending Still Murky, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010, at A1 
(“Because of loopholes in tax laws and a weak enforcement policy at the Federal Election Commission, 
corporations and wealthy donors have been able to spend huge sums on campaign ads, confident the public 
will not know who they are, election law experts say.”); Editorial, The Secret Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2010, at WK8 (noting Congress’s failure to pass disclosure requirements in the immediate aftermath of 
Citizens United). 
 181 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam). 
 182 See Rickert v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (striking down an amended statute 
that prohibited sponsoring with actual malice a political advertisement containing a false statement of material 
fact about a candidate for public office); State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 
P.2d 691 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (striking down a state statute that prohibited the sponsorship of political 
advertisements containing false statements of material fact). But see Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (characterizing calculated falsehoods during political campaigns as unprotected by the First 
Amendment), aff’d mem., 423 U.S. 1041 (1976). 
 183 See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 917–18 (2010) 
(“[N]either First Amendment theory, nor history, nor doctrine significantly restrict[s] the government’s ability 
to attempt to correct widespread public factual inaccuracy . . . .”). I leave for another day the question of 
whether the Constitution prohibits government falsehoods. 
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equality-based conception of free speech when its voice counters that of 
powerful, private speakers. 
To be sure, some who take an equality-based view of the First Amendment 
may view government speakers—like corporations or other wealthy, private 
speakers—as nonetheless threatening to the interests of less powerful speakers. 
For example, they may argue that the government’s inherent power, prestige, 
and especially resources tilt the playing field such that dissenting speakers 
cannot fairly compete. 
Of course, the government will not inevitably speak in opposition to 
powerful, private interests; indeed, it is often aligned with them. But closer 
examination reveals a number of checks that limit the dangers to other 
speakers’ equality interests posed by government speech. For example, the 
government is by no means monolithic.184 Instead, it comprises a large number 
and range of potential government speakers—both individual and 
institutional—with various interests. This suggests the possibility of diverse 
views even among government speakers, at least some of which may diverge 
from the views of powerful, private speakers. Indeed, that government speech 
is by no means monolithic both adds to its informational value and detracts 
from its potential danger. Different branches of the government can and do 
disagree in a way that helps inform voters. Such disagreements occur both 
horizontally (for example, when the executive disagrees with the legislature) 
and vertically (when federal and state governments disagree). For example, 
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder expressed the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
opposition to a proposed California ballot measure to legalize marijuana on the 
grounds that it would “greatly complicate federal drug enforcement efforts to 
the detriment of our citizens.”185 This prompted counter-speech by the 
measure’s proponents who assailed what they characterized as a defense of a 
failed war on drugs.186 
Such expressive tensions inform and spur debate, while lessening the 
chance that government speech is monopolistic. Moreover, the collective-
action problems confronted by institutional government speakers further 
undermine the notion of government as monolithic, and potentially 
 
 184 See YUDOF, supra note 72, at 114–16 (describing how federalism, separation of powers, and the 
variety of administrative agencies considerably fragment political power, thus undermining the possibility of 
monolithic government speech). 
 185 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to Former Administrators of the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (Oct. 13, 2010) (on file with author). 
 186 John Hoeffel, Holder Vows Fight over Prop. 19, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, at AA1. 
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monopolistic, speaker. Indeed, such problems may encourage such speakers to 
be more deliberative as a result. And, of course, government speakers remain 
politically accountable to the populace in ways untrue of private speakers.187 
To be sure, public entities and officials may have considerable self-interest 
in the outcome of contested ballot measures and legislative proposals. For 
example, such votes may determine the level of funding available to 
government. The government’s campaign speech can also be self-interested in 
ways other than purely financial—as may be the case with government speech 
opposing term limits or government speech otherwise aligned with what the 
government speaker sees as its political advantage. But as Professors Redish 
and Mollen persuasively explain in another context, a speaker’s self-interested 
motivation does not necessarily negate the value of that information to the 
listener.188 Although most speakers are self-interested in some way,189 such 
motivation rarely justifies limiting their speech (although it may well justify 
listeners’ skepticism). What the listener needs, ideally, is an understanding of 
the speaker’s self-interest when evaluating her speech.190 As discussed above, 
such an understanding may be more readily available with respect to 
government, as opposed to private, speech: voters can assess the government 
speaker’s self-interest and hold her accountable for it.191 
In short, government speech on issue campaigns generally furthers, rather 
than frustrates, key constitutional interests. Transparently governmental 
campaign speech often provides great value to the public. It enhances political 
accountability by informing voters of their governments’ priorities and 
preferences, provides a valuable heuristic for comparatively uninformed 
 
 187 Compare Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 717–18 
(2011) (“So long as the government identifies itself when speaking, the public can hold government speakers 
politically accountable and curb their excesses.”), with Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech and the 
Falsification of Consent, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1752–53 (1983) (reviewing YUDOF, supra note 72) 
(“[C]orporations seek profit without concern for externalities and use enormous wealth in ways bearing no 
necessary or even likely relationship to the beliefs of their shareholders . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 188 Redish & Mollen, supra note 126, at 1317. 
 189 See id. at 1341 (“Speakers do not always speak solely to contribute to public discourse or solely for 
narrow personal economic gain.”). 
 190 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791–92 (1978) (“[T]he people in our democracy 
are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. 
They may consider, in making their judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 191 See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981) (recognizing a value 
to voters of knowing “the identity of those whose money supports or opposes a given ballot measure”); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam) (“The sources of a candidate’s financial support . . . alert 
the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of 
future performance in office.”). 
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voters, and enriches the marketplace of available ideas and arguments, 
especially (but not only) as a counter to expression from powerful, private 
sources. 
III.  CONSIDERING POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL CAMPAIGN 
SPEECH 
The preceding Part concluded that the government does not violate the 
Constitution simply by taking sides in contested ballot or legislative 
campaigns. To be sure, however, I do not claim that the government’s 
campaign speech is (or should be) entirely free from constraint.192 
For example, even though the preceding Part concluded that the 
government’s campaign speech on ballot and legislative measures is consistent 
with the Free Speech Clause, other constitutional constraints—such as the 
Establishment Clause—remain in play as independent checks on government 
speech generally, including, but not limited to, the government’s campaign 
speech.193 The remainder of this Part briefly explores other possible 
limitations. 
A. The Transparency Requirement as a Constitutional Limitation on 
Government Speech Generally 
Recall that the previous Part’s emphasis on the instrumental value of the 
government’s campaign speech referred only to transparently governmental 
speech—expression that the public can identify as governmental in source and 
thus hold the government accountable for it.194 I have urged previously that the 
government should be permitted to assert the government speech defense to 
free speech challenges only when it can establish that it expressly claimed the 
speech as its own when it authorized the communication and that onlookers 
understood the speech to be the government’s at the time of its delivery.195 The 
 
 192 See Schauer, supra note 72, at 384–85 (“[That the First Amendment does not constrain government 
speech] does not mean that government communication is not a constitutional problem under some other 
clause of the Constitution, or that it is not a political or moral problem. . . . When government misuses its 
power to communicate we do have a problem, but this does not mean that we have a first amendment 
problem.” (footnote omitted)). 
 193 See supra note 19. 
 194 See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text. 
 195 See Norton, supra note 146, at 599 (“[T]he government can establish its entitlement to the government 
speech defense only when it establishes itself as the source of that expression both as a formal and as a 
functional matter. In other words, government must expressly claim the speech as its own when it authorizes or 
creates a communication and onlookers must understand the message to be the government’s at the time of its 
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Supreme Court, however, has yet to impose such a constitutional requirement 
in the context of government speech more generally196—a doctrinal failure that 
I have criticized elsewhere.197 Such a transparency requirement would be 
especially valuable in the context of the government’s campaign speech on 
contested policy matters because it would maximize the public’s ability to 
engage in meaningful political accountability measures as well as in 
undeceived assessments of the message’s credibility.198 
B. Constitutional Limitations on Government Speech on Candidate 
Campaigns 
So far this Article has focused on the government’s speech on issue 
campaigns—government speech that advocates a position on a contested ballot 
measure to be decided by the voters or on contested legislation to be 
considered by another governmental body. In contrast, the use of official 
government resources to engage in campaign speech endorsing or opposing 
specific candidates raises potentially greater threats to First Amendment 
interests in restraining the self-perpetuation of incumbents and preventing the 
entrenchment of political power.199 This subpart proposes a constitutional 
limitation on the government’s expressive participation in candidate, as 
opposed to issue, campaigns. Here I focus on the First Amendment as the 
primary (but not necessarily only200) constitutional source of such a limitation, 
 
delivery.”). For other commentators’ thoughtful discussions of these and related issues, see Randall P. 
Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2001); 
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
605 (2008); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002); and Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 
HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005). 
 196 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563–64 (2005). 
 197 See, e.g., Norton & Citron, supra note 5. 
 198 Private speakers, unlike the government, have autonomy interests protected by the First Amendment. 
For this reason, the Court has interpreted the First Amendment to protect private speakers’ anonymity under 
certain circumstances. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (striking down 
Ohio’s ban on the distribution of unsigned political leaflets). 
 199 Recall that this Article focuses only on speech that represents the views of a government entity or 
branch, as opposed to individual government officials’ speech expressing their own views on their own time 
and at their own expense, as individuals do not relinquish their First Amendment rights to express personal 
beliefs upon taking office. See, e.g., Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 750 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (D. Colo. 
1990); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects judges’ speech as candidates for judicial elections). 
 200 Other commentators have plausibly identified other potential constitutional sources of similar 
principles, including equal protection and substantive due process. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the 
Democratic Process: Voter Standing to Challenge Abuses of Incumbency, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 778 (1988) 
(“[T]he equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is violated if the government acts to aid only the 
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rooted in an understanding of that provision as informing and empowering the 
people’s meaningful self-governance—their free choice about whom to elect. 
Such an understanding of the First Amendment thus supports a principle 
prohibiting governmental campaign speech that directly seeks to entrench 
political power.201 
To be sure, identifying impermissibly self-perpetuating government speech 
presents significant challenges. Much, and probably most, government speech 
on any issue seems inextricable from a government speaker’s self-interest in 
reelection. For just one of many contemporary examples, consider the 
controversy over federal highway signs that noted that certain construction 
projects were funded by the federal stimulus package.202 Critics charged that 
the signs amounted to “political boosterism,” while the federal government as 
speaker emphasized the signs’ informational function: “taxpayers should know 
how stimulus dollars are being spent.”203 
Indeed, government speakers are often—and unavoidably—motivated both 
by public-minded and self-interested purposes.204 But unless one is willing to 
prohibit government speech on issue campaigns as a constitutional matter—
and for the reasons explained in the preceding Part, I am not—perhaps the best 
 
incumbent. . . . Those who support challengers have their votes diluted by abuse of incumbency in exactly the 
same way the malapportionment or stuffing of the ballot box lessens the effectiveness of an individual’s 
vote.”); Greene, supra note 108, at 38 (noting that efforts to entrench incumbents and thwart challengers 
“violate[] one of the two key principles of the famous footnote four [i]n Carolene Products, and should be 
deemed invalid” (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938))). 
 201 See Shiffrin, supra note 55, at 602 (“Citizens are entitled to a government that is neutral in the process 
of selecting candidates. Whether or not the concept of self-government is ‘central’ to the first amendment, it is 
undeniably an important first amendment value, and the integrity of the democratic process could rightly be 
questioned if government officially intervened in the political process to favor particular candidates. Whether 
or not the intervention was powerful, it would ipso facto disturb the first amendment equality principle.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 202 See Colorado Will Keep Stimulus Highway Signs, STREET (Sept. 28, 2009, 10:53 AM), http://www. 
thestreet.com/story/10604159/1/colorado-will-keep-stimulus-highway-signs.html. 
 203 Id. 
 204 See, e.g., CHAFEE, supra note 143, at 764–65 (“Some of these quandaries seem to me unavoidable if 
we are to have any sort of adequate information service. Effective presentation of any recent achievement of 
the government, no matter how completely it is accepted by everybody, cannot help benefiting the party and 
the officials who made that achievement possible. . . . In spite of the risks that men who know exactly what 
they want and are acquainted with the latest techniques for manipulating public opinion will dispose of large 
sums for their personal or departmental advantage, we may be wise to run those risks for the sake of the values 
of public information . . . in enabling citizens to govern themselves more intelligently.”); Shiffrin, supra note 
55, at 603 (“Non-partisan aspects such as informing the populace of government policy and explaining that 
policy are also necessarily partisan because incumbent candidates almost invariably claim that their reelection 
is justified by their link to the government policy they explain and defend.”). 
NORTON GALLEYSFINAL2.DOCX 4/10/2012 7:18 AM 
258 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:209 
we can do is to root out government speech expressly geared to influencing 
results in current, contested candidate elections on the premise that official 
government speech most directly connected to candidate electioneering is 
generally more dangerous and less valuable than government speech on issue 
campaigns. Given that most government speech inevitably includes some mix 
of self-interested and public-spirited motivations, this may be more a 
difference of degree than a difference in kind. Yet I contend that the difference 
still remains meaningful. Thomas Emerson, for example, proposed a similar 
test: 
The government’s right of expression does not extend to any sphere 
that is outside the governmental function. This might not seem to be 
much of a limitation; the governmental function certainly covers an 
extensive area. Nevertheless the principle does impose some limits. 
Thus the government would not be empowered to engage in 
expression in direct support of a particular candidate for office. It is 
not the function of the government to get itself reelected.205 
Along these lines, I too prefer a constitutional principle that permits 
transparently governmental speech on issue, but not candidate, campaigns. 
Steven Shiffrin, in contrast, proposes a different principle. Identifying 
government expression’s potential threats to the equality interests of dissenting 
speakers as a greater danger than that of self-perpetuation, he suggests instead 
that the Constitution should be understood to limit the volume or means of the 
government’s expressive expenditures in both candidate and issue 
campaigns.206 For example, he proposes that the “government should not be 
permitted to send mail to its citizens stating its views or adequate provision for 
opposing views must be made.”207 
Although I appreciate Professor Shiffrin’s thoughtful discussion of the 
benefits as well as the dangers of the government’s campaign speech, I find a 
constitutional line that turns on the amount of funds spent on the government’s 
expressive purposes as especially arbitrary to draw (and instead more 
appropriate for possible statutory limitations discussed below than for a 
constitutional principle).208 Indeed, such a line seems particularly problematic 
given that all government speech requires some expenditure of public 
 
 205 EMERSON, supra note 143, at 699. 
 206 See Shiffrin, supra note 55, at 617. 
 207 Id. 
 208 For a discussion of possible statutory limitations on the government’s expressive expenditures, see 
infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
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resources, even if only in the form of government workers’ time and 
opportunity costs. Moreover, the instrumental value of the government’s 
campaign speech turns in large part on its actual ability to reach and thus 
inform listeners, an ability that often requires money—e.g., money to fund 
studies on the implications of a proposal; to publish and disseminate reports, 
flyers, and pamphlets; and perhaps to buy advertising. As Alan Chen observes: 
To be sure, the government will have a greater chance of 
persuading people to agree with its position than a grass roots 
political organization with few resources. But so will Microsoft. Or, 
after the past Supreme Court term, groups such as Citizens United. 
Unless we start requiring something akin to the fairness doctrine 
whenever the government engages in speech, which would be both 
impracticable and unpalatable, transparency is about the best we can 
hope for in an imperfect doctrinal world.209 
For these reasons, I propose a constitutional limitation on the government’s 
power to participate expressively in candidate campaigns, while rejecting 
constitutional limitations on the government’s expenditure of resources for 
expressive purposes more generally. As the next section explains, however, 
legislatures remain free to limit such expenditures as a statutory matter. 
C. Statutory Limitations on Government Speech on Issue Campaigns 
Even if the government’s speech on contested issue campaigns does not 
violate the Constitution, as this Article asserts, nonconstitutional solutions 
remain available to policymakers interested in constraining the government’s 
campaign speech of all types.210 
1. Statutory Limitations on the Government’s Expenditures for Expression 
Relating to Issue Campaigns 
As discussed above, I see no constitutional bar to the government’s ability 
to spend public money for expressive purposes, even on matters that divide its 
constituents. Indeed, the government does so all the time, as the Supreme 
Court has recognized outside of the campaign context.211 But for those who 
remain concerned that the government’s access to public funds for expressive 
purposes will permit it to drown out the speech of others, and thus monopolize 
 
 209 Chen, supra note 127 (endnotes omitted). 
 210 As discussed supra note 100, the fact that the government is not a First Amendment rights holder itself 
leaves open the possibility that its speech could be constrained through statute and other policy measures. 
 211 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
NORTON GALLEYSFINAL2.DOCX 4/10/2012 7:18 AM 
260 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:209 
the marketplace of ideas, statutory options remain available, as legislatures 
could cap (or entirely prohibit) expenditures for the government’s campaign 
speech on ballot measures. Indeed, many state statutes already prohibit any 
state employee or officer from using state facilities or funds in “the promotion 
of or opposition to a ballot proposition.”212 
2. Statutory Limitations on the Government’s Power to Deviate from 
Expressive Neutrality in Issue Campaigns 
Although this Article concludes that the Constitution does not require the 
government’s expressive neutrality with respect to issue campaigns, 
nonconstitutional constraints remain available here as well. For example, in his 
groundbreaking work on government speech, Mark Yudof suggested that state 
legislatures consider amending the default presumption as to whether issue-
related campaign speech by state or local government agencies is authorized 
under state statutes that define and limit the powers of such bodies.213 In other 
words, he proposed a statutory strategy to limit the enumerated powers of 
certain government actors to exclude certain expressive activities. 
Indeed, legislatures not uncommonly impose more targeted statutory limits 
on government actors’ deviation from expressive neutrality where such 
deviation is considered especially dangerous. Consider, as just one example, 
state conflict-of-interest laws that prohibit public officials from advocating the 
 
 212 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.52.180(1) (West Supp. 2010); accord COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-
117(1)(a)(I) (2010) (prohibiting public entities from expending any public monies from any source for 
contributions to a campaign for elected office, or to urge electors to vote in favor of or against any ballot issue 
or referred measure); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 16-119 (West 1997) (prohibiting state officials from 
“direct[ing] or authoriz[ing] the expenditure of any public funds under [their] care, except as specifically 
authorized by law, to be used either in support of, or in opposition to, any measure which is being referred to a 
vote of the people by means of the initiative or referendum, or which citizens of this state are attempting to 
have referred to a vote of the people by the initiative or referendum”). Some of these laws, however, permit 
public officials to express their views on such measures in certain situations. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9-369b(a) (West 2009) (explaining that its prohibition does “not apply to a written, printed or typed 
summary of an official’s views on a proposal or question, which is prepared for any news medium”); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 106.113(3) (West Supp. 2011) (explaining that its prohibition “does not preclude an elected 
official of the local government from expressing an opinion on any issue at any time”); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 42.52.180(2)(a) (explaining that its prohibition does not apply to members of an elected body 
expressing their collective opinion on a ballot measure so long as required notice is provided and members of 
the public are given approximately the same opportunity to voice opposing viewpoints). 
 213 See YUDOF, supra note 72, at 47 (“The greatest threat of government domination and distortion of 
majoritarian processes emanates from executive bodies and officers. The greatest hope of restraining that 
power lies with the legislative branches of government. If a legislative body determines that particular 
government expression threatens democratic processes, the courts should not second-guess that decision.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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passage or failure of matters in which they have, or may be perceived to have, 
a conflict of interest.214 
* * * 
Just because such nonconstitutional options are available to policymakers, 
however, does not mean that they are necessarily wise. Indeed, because I find 
government speech with respect to issue campaigns of such great instrumental 
value to the public, I remain uncomfortable with blanket withdrawals of the 
government’s expressive authority even as a policy matter. Vastly preferable, 
in my opinion, are policy approaches that target specific government speakers 
in response to evidence of abuse in specific contexts, rather than relying on 
broad and unsupported conclusions about the danger of government speech 
generally.215 In short, policymakers should proceed with caution, preferring the 
scalpel to the bludgeon when choosing policy tools for addressing 
governmental misuse of its expressive power. 
As one example of such a targeted policy response to specific abuses of the 
government’s expressive power, recall recent controversies over the federal 
government’s allegedly covert speech—executive branch speech that did not 
make clear its governmental source.216 Congress could—and, in my opinion, 
should—encourage greater executive branch transparency by amending the 
longstanding propaganda ban specifically to define such covert speech as 
prohibited and to provide meaningful enforcement mechanisms to punish and 
deter such speech. 
As another example, consider policymakers’ concerns about efforts by the 
White House Office of Political Affairs to use government resources to fund 
expression to reelect incumbents. In response, a House committee 
recommended elimination of that office as well as amendments to the Hatch 
Act to create meaningful penalties for violations of that Act.217 This too 
 
 214 See Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011) (rejecting a legislator’s First 
Amendment challenge to a Nevada law prohibiting public officials from voting or advocating with respect to 
matters in which the legislator has an actual or perceived conflict of interest and detailing the long history of 
such statutes). 
 215 See YUDOF, supra note 72, at 111–38 (urging legislative bodies to consider the dangers of government 
speech in deciding what types of government expression to authorize and to prohibit); Jacobs, supra note 83 
(proposing a variety of statutory checks on Article II speakers). 
 216 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 217 COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, at ii (2008). 
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exemplifies an appropriately calibrated policy response targeted to specific 
instances of government abuse of its expressive power. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article seeks to reexamine longstanding controversies over the 
government’s campaign speech by considering them in light of lessons from 
contemporary constitutional debates over campaign finance reform and 
government speech more generally. This inquiry invites important and 
challenging questions about both the nature of government and the nature of 
speech. When is government speech on contested public policy debates most 
valuable in facilitating participation in democratic self-governance and 
contributing to the dissemination of knowledge—and when, if ever, does such 
government expression endanger key constitutional values by drowning out 
others’ political speech or by entrenching incumbent political power? Can 
government ever simply participate in the marketplace of ideas in contested 
issue campaigns, or does its participation in such contests instead frustrate 
political competition? Is there any reason to depart from the traditional 
assumption that more speech is better than less when the government seeks to 
add its voice to the available body of expression? 
This Article concludes that government speech on issue campaigns 
generally furthers, rather than frustrates, key constitutional values. More 
specifically, it finds that transparently governmental campaign speech on 
contested ballot and legislative measures is rarely, if ever, more harmful to 
First Amendment liberty or equality interests than that of any other speaker 
because in such contexts the government is acting as a participant in the 
marketplace of ideas, rather than as a regulator. Indeed, such government 
campaign speech is often of great value to the public. It enhances political 
accountability by informing voters of their governments’ priorities and 
preferences, provides a valuable heuristic for those who do not have the time 
or expertise to evaluate the competing arguments for themselves, and 
sometimes provides a counter to expression from powerful, private sources that 
often operate in nontransparent ways. 
To be sure, however, the government’s campaign speech should not be 
entirely free from constraint. First, the government’s campaign speech on 
contested ballot or legislative measures should be considered consistent with 
constitutional values only when that speech is transparently governmental in 
origin—when the public can clearly identify the message’s governmental 
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origins and thus hold the government politically accountable for its views. 
Second, government entities’ campaign speech endorsing or opposing specific 
candidates raises distinct constitutional threats to First Amendment interests in 
constraining incumbents’ self-perpetuation and entrenchment. Finally, 
statutory and other nonconstitutional limits on the government’s campaign 
speech remain available. The substantial instrumental value of the 
government’s issue-related campaign speech to the public, however, should 
counsel policymakers to proceed with caution, focusing their efforts to target 
identified abuses of the government’s expressive power, rather than relying on 
broader and unsupported conclusions about the danger of government 
campaign speech generally. 
 
